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## EDITORIAL

### The New Archbishop and his Task

DR TEMPLE'S appointment to the Archbishopric of Canterbury has been accompanied by the expression of many hopes that, as one writer put it, " with him at the helm, the Church will play an increasingly vigorous part in the national life." There is indeed every reason to expect that the new Primate will constantly testify to the bearing of Christianity not only on national, but also on international, affairs. *The Times* newspaper, in the tribute which it paid to Dr Lang when his retirement was announced, said that " most wisely . . . he has consistently stood apart from schemes which seek to identify the work of the Church with the development of any political programme." Although Dr Temple has himself emphatically protested against any such identification, still that particular encomium is not one that he has gone out of his way to invite. We may perhaps thank Dr Lang that the Church of England did not during the early months of this war get itself tied up with propaganda for a scheme of " Federal Union " in much the same way as it had previously tied itself up with the League of Nations. If he was not able to advocate genuine solutions, he had the great merit of not being taken in by bogus or second-rate schemes.

During the last hundred years the social conscience of the nation, even more than of the Church, has been progressively stirred; there must be no going back on that. The question is: How can it be stirred now to better effect? What ought the Church to do that it has not yet done? It seems to us that the new Archbishop and Church organizations in this country have already said as much as they can usefully say about the general principles of post-war reconstruction. Until we can know approximately what conditions will be like at the end of the war, it is impossible

to say how those principles will apply. It will be more to the point during the war to focus attention on specific evils or injustices which could be remedied immediately—*i.e.*, while the war is still being fought. As to what is within the range of actual possibilities—in regard, for example, to changes in industrial organization or to equity in rationing—lay men and lay women with the appropriate technical knowledge and experience are better qualified to say than bishops and clergy, and we hope that Dr Temple's policy will be to discourage general pronouncements by ecclesiastics and to encourage responsible leadership and action by the Christian laity.

While any return to, or perpetuation of, ecclesiastical introversion or a religion of the sacristy would be deplorable, yet the statement that the first task of the Church is to be the Church may indicate the way to immediate action. The Church should be concerned with its own life and affairs, not for its own sake, but for God's sake and for the world's sake. When we did not want the Church, it was there; now that we are wanting it rather desperately, it seems to be missing. Instead of a Church it looks as though all we may have left is an ecclesiastical skeleton alongside a vague and vanishing disembodied spirit of idealism. To avert such a conclusion must be the first concern of the bishops and clergy; if they will show that the Church is really determined to be the Church, they will be going further to meet the world's hunger for social justice than they ever will be by devoutly echoing the speeches of statesmen or competing with the economic planners.

Dr Arnold's well-known saying that no human power could save the Church (as it was in 1832), which is often quoted with complacency as though the Oxford Movement had refuted it, is nevertheless a faithful and true saying concerning the Church in 1942 and concerning every Church in every age. God alone can save the Church and keep it in existence. A Church which is not continually repenting and being reformed is on the way to death. But this is also a hard saying; who can hear it? It is for the Church's ministers first to hear it for themselves and then to make it heard of all. A National Church is a Church which continually summons the nation to, by leading it in, the way of repentance and reformation.

There is thus plenty to engage the energies of ecclesiastics in their own proper field, where also there is more scope

for carrying out, or at least for initiating, reforms while the war is still on. Before suggesting certain specific areas where reform is needed in the Church of England, we would urge that in every area the time has come to take theology much more seriously. Fairly ample lip service is paid to the importance of theological study, among other things. But the question is whether the miscellaneous reformist movements and tendencies in the Church are really prepared to put the renovation of the Anglican doctrinal tradition in the forefront of the needs they recognize, and to derive particular proposals from a new understanding of the Gospel on which the Church is founded instead of merely elaborating them piecemeal on the basis of the needs of the present age with some bits of theology thrown in. In the first place, therefore, we would inquire whether, at Lambeth—by which we mean the headquarters both of the Church of England and of the Anglican communion, there is an adequate staff not only of administrators but of theologians. We will not go so far as to advocate the formation of a fully-fledged curia and college of cardinals at Lambeth; but we presume that there is a possible mean between that and the present amateur and casual arrangements. Until there is a staff of full-time theologians at the disposal of the Primate and of the bench of bishops, a staff with sufficient standing to prevent the sidetracking or confusion of theological issues, it is unlikely that theology will be taken as seriously as it should be everywhere else in the Church. Archbishops' Commissions would still be of great service, but by themselves, when they are composed of men who are already heavily engaged in other duties, they are too cumbrous, dilatory and occasional to meet the needs of this, or indeed of any, time.

Take, for instance, the reform of Church services. Opinions may differ as to whether the approval recently given in the Upper House of Canterbury Convocation to certain optional changes in the order of the Communion Service is expedient or not. At the best it is a makeshift arrangement which can be justified only as a means of reducing liturgical chaos to simpler proportions. What is needed now is a fresh approach to the whole subject of Prayer Book revision which will attempt, not to strike a bargain between the various factions in the Church, but to inquire into the principles of an Anglican liturgy in the

light of the Gospel of God as received in this Church and realm and as the final criterion of Church order everywhere. At the same time, since new and extra-liturgical forms of service are needed if the Gospel is to be presented to the multitudes who are quite unfamiliar with the rudiments of Christianity, an inquiry should be made as to how far or in what way such evangelistic services ought to be subject to regulation. " Life and Liberty " was the slogan of the Church reformers at the end of the last war; " Order and Discipline " would strike a more promising note this time, but in that case authority must be traced to its source in the Gospel.

This again shows the need for a resumption and expansion of the task which was undertaken by the Archbishops' Commission on Christian Doctrine (1922-38). Its Report seems to have been officially pigeonholed like so many others. The good things it contains are not being absorbed, partly because of the perverse activities of an unholy alliance of near-fundamentalists, but also because of the manifest deficiencies of the Report if it is looked to for illumination on the questions which have come into the centre of the picture since the time when the Commission was appointed. We hope that in this respect the Archbishop will not let the grass grow under his feet. The article by Dr Demant in this number opens up a whole range of basic problems which are crying aloud for concentrated and concerted attention. Not until Anglican theologians have got some idea as to where they stand, and for what they stand, *as a body* and not merely as so many individuals, will they be qualified either to serve their own Church to good purpose or to engage in ecumenical discussion with theologians in other traditions. A book like Mr Daniel T. Jenkins' *The Nature of Catholicity*,[1] if we attended to it, would reveal the disarray in our ranks; it also goes to show that the only tolerable road to reunion is by a deeper theological seriousness.

Another task, about which something can now be done, at least by way of active preparation, is in the field of training for the ministry. Here, too, theological considerations should be primary. But further comment on this subject may be deferred until we are able to consider the interim Report of the Archbishops' Commission.

[1] Faber and Faber, 5s.

Lastly, there are the proposed reforms which have been advocated under the title of *Putting Our House in Order.*[1] The Archbishop, in common with twenty-five diocesan bishops, declared last year that he was prepared to give his support to a movement " in this direction now." We shall be interested to see exactly what he meant, and how he intends to set about it, now that he is in the key position, if there is a key position. While reforms in this direction are long overdue and should be taken in hand without further delay, we are sure that those who are responsible for these proposals do not suppose that the removal of economic and similar anomalies will by itself touch the roots of the disease in the Church. Residence in Wales, where most of the proposed reforms have been in operation for a considerable time, would correct any such idea if it existed. It may, in fact, be awareness of this circumstance that weakens the drive of this movement. Many will rally to the cause of economic reform in the Church if the Archbishop is able to include that within a larger policy —a " putting our house in order " at the foundations and in the upper storeys as well as in the rooms where economic man feels most at home, or rather would like to feel at home.

[1] For the latest " statement of policy " by this group, see *M.M.M. Supplementary Paper I.* (fifty copies may be obtained for 2s. post free from the Rev. F. Lishman, Shadwell Vicarage, Leeds).

## The Old Archbishop and the New[1]

Virginia Woolf wrote, some years back, a rather teasing sketch of Archbishop Thomson of York, who was appointed Primate of England eighty years ago. It is a queer picture she draws of this forty-three-year-old prelate in his northern palace; with nine children in the nursery and (one imagines, for their ample nourishment) seven cows in the park; and the Archbishop writing sometimes as many as eighty letters before breakfast. All very well; the children, the cows, the letters, and so on. But what Virginia Woolf wanted to know was this—" Is it easy, is it possible, for a good man to be an Archbishop ?"

And the Church historian, as he dips his pen in the ink and remembers that he is dealing with thirteen centuries and more of history, may be forgiven if he hesitates a little before committing himself to too sweeping an answer. For he will have to look a long way back: to Augustine and Anselm, to Laud and Cranmer, and to—others ! And, soon or late, he will come down to March, 1942, when an event took place that occurs only about seven times in a century; for then one Primate of All England ended his reign, and another was appointed to his place.

With this for his subject, where will he begin ? If the generation for which he writes has not changed much from our own, he may try to rouse its interest by first picking out the less common features of the Primacy that is now drawing to its close. He will record that Dr Lang had the unique honour of being translated from a suffragan district to a metropolitan see—from Stepney to York. He will be sure to add that His Grace is a son of the manse; only the third Scot in the long line of ninety-seven Archbishops of Canterbury. And here he might be tempted into a digression on Scottish " caution." But were I at his elbow I would bid him tell, rather, of a wild wet night that I remember in Chicago, nearly a quarter of a century ago. Dr Lang was leaving a meeting he had addressed when, as he stepped on to the pavement, his coat was clutched by a little wizened man. I can see now the slant of the rain dripping, through the light of an arc lamp, on the old man's tattered sleeve, as he whispered to His Grace—" I

[1] Broadcast on February 23, 1942.

mind ye when ye were a wee laddie at the manse, and I've sung the Psawms of David in your father's hoose." Was I wrong in thinking that there one heard the authentic voice of old Scotland, 4,500 miles away ?

But our chronicler will make light (as indeed he should) of this tale of a day, for he will have more important incidents to recall in the life of Dr Lang: of Royal Commissions on which he has sat, where his penetrating judgment was welcomed and valued; of duties that fell to His Grace on great occasions of State for more than forty years—from the day when he stood on the jetty at Portsmouth to receive the body of Queen Victoria on her last journey from Osborne, to the Coronation of our King and Queen. And, should the historian regard a gift of speech as an essential part of an Archbishop's outfit, he will quote verbatim the five-minute sermon preached at the Coronation of King George V, long forgotten now except by those who heard it, but acclaimed by John Morley (no mean judge of the art of public speaking) as one of the finest examples of concentrated oratory he had ever heard. Indeed, for those who know the Archbishop only through a loud-speaker, it is not easy to imagine the full quality of that voice in his prime. But I at least can remember standing inside St Paul's Cathedral one Sunday afternoon (it must be nearly forty years ago) with my back against the West door because every seat seemed to be filled, and missing not one word of the sermon of " C. G. Stepney," as he then was. This was the man portrayed to the life by " Spy " in his *Vanity Fair* cartoon as " A Bishop of Decision "; from whose house in Amen Court there radiated an influence far beyond the boundary of his own Communion, which those who came under it (among them was Dick Sheppard of St Martin's) knew to be that of a prophet of social righteousness with one ideal only, the Kingdom of God; and with one dominating desire, that the Church should take a stronger and more direct part in helping that Kingdom to come on earth.

There have, as a natural result, been occasions on which the Archbishop's utterances have provoked outspoken criticism. And among His Grace's warmest admirers are some who regret that he (like his predecessor) has held himself too much aloof from the unofficial world to measure accurately, in every event, the direction and the potential value of public opinion. On such a vexed question—

especially on Dr Lang's broadcast at the abdication of Edward VIII—it is not for me to say more than just this to-night: that, if there is a " public " opinion in this country, there is also a Christian opinion; and it is of this that the Archbishop has constantly striven, through good and ill report, to be the voice. Is less than this to be expected of an Archbishop? Can more be asked of him?

But the Primate of All England is not only a great Officer of State. He is also the unofficial head of the whole Anglican Communion, which holds its distinctive place in world-Christendom, and makes continuous demands on the utmost that a vigorous and watchful leader can give to it, of time and thought. And—there is also a Church of England, *in* England. Here Dr Lang's work has been more widely known; and none who has watched him in the Chair at the Church Assembly, or heard him take a Confirmation in a village church, or talked with him over his study fire, can receive any impression but one. It is that of a man of deep religious insight, wide culture, shrewd and forceful judgment, and (not least) affectionate human sympathy. To more than one of these qualities many outside his own communion would bear their witness. For it may be doubted whether any one person (at least among Anglicans) has laboured more patiently, in spite of all delays and setbacks, in the cause of Christian unity, or has made a greater personal contribution to its achievement.

There is one official act in particular that a grateful Church and country will not fail to remember. I assume (though I know less than nothing of high ecclesiastical politics) that the views of a retiring Archbishop of Canterbury are not wholly disregarded in the choice, which falls to the Crown, of his successor. If I am right, then there are few of his public services for which Dr Lang will be more worthily remembered than for whatever part he may have played in advising the Crown to appoint Dr William Temple in his stead. For many reasons; and for this above all others. Suppose that to-day the Church had no official connexion with the State; that it held (with " Presumption " in *The Pilgrim's Progress*) that " every vat should stand upon its own bottom "; and that the selection of the Primate rested (to put it quite vaguely) with " the Church." Can it be doubted that a striking majority of churchpeople would have made the same choice? Nor—which is even more important—that in this majority would be found a

considerable number who are far from agreeing with some of Dr Temple's most strongly held views? Yet, in spite of that, they would ask for him, because in him they have recognized qualities of intellectual power and spiritual leadership that mark him out as the most obviously outstanding figure in the National Church. . . . And never more sorely than to-day, in its long history, can the Church have needed the inspiration of such leadership, or the infection of such power.

But these are high themes. Let us, on our way to them, get rid of one or two quite mundane matters, which seem to be on the top of many persons' minds, whenever the Archbishop of Canterbury or his office is mentioned. First, where is the new Archbishop going to live? There is not quite so much choice here as there used to be. It is not very long since the Primate used to pass some of the year pleasantly enough in his palace at Addington. And those who have played golf on the Old Course there, and have perpetrated an outrageous pull on their way to the eighth green, may have found themselves (as I did one day) trying to extricate their ball from the base of an obelisk, on which it is recorded in " tombstone Latin " that here a cedar-tree was planted by Archbishop Charles Manners-Sutton on October 25, 1809, to commemorate the day on which George III entered the fiftieth year of his reign. But Archbishops no longer enjoy their morning rides in Addington Park, and the Palace is now the Addington Palace Country Club—I am glad they have kept the old name. There is also the Old Palace at Canterbury; a good bit of Lambeth still stands, in spite of the bombs; and the tradition would be hard to break of the Primate making his headquarters at Lambeth Palace.

And next—what is he going to live on? Well, it doesn't look at first sight as if the wolves would find a very good jumping-off ground at the front-door in that bleak courtyard at Lambeth; for our reference books tell us that the Archbishop of Canterbury receives £15,000 a year. Of this one used to be frequently reminded in Victoria Park (London, E.) in the days when many of us indulged in a necessary (but, I cannot think, very profitable) form of evangelism—open-air speaking from a Christian Evidence platform. The main question was usually preceded by a purely genealogical one: " Who was Cain's wife?" Then (unless our wits were shattered by that beyond repair)

"Why does the Archbishop of Canterbury get fifteen thousand a year?" (The figure was apt to vary between that sum and fifty thousand.) And some of the more subtle antagonists would have worked it out at so much an hour; which made the sum compare very favourably, one must confess, with what we used to know in East London as the "Dockers' Tanner."

Now there are three answers to this question. The first is John Bright's, which combines the simplicity of an accurate diagnosis with the suggestion of an obvious remedy. "If I were paid," he once said, "what a bishop is paid for doing what a bishop does, I should have ample cause for merriment in the credulity of my fellow-countrymen." The second was once given with characteristic bluntness by an eminent churchman—"If you want brains, you've got to pay for them." This—remember—was long ago: our approach nowadays is a different one. And the third answer to the question why a man in such a position should enjoy so enormous an income is that he doesn't: unless you are prepared to include in his income what he has to spend (whether he likes it or not) on his official duties; on meeting his official expenses; on distributing his official hospitalities; and on performing a hundred other official acts, of the necessity for which one must hope that Archbishops are the best judges! And I am not alone in wishing that some means could be found of separating an Archbishop's or bishop's official expenses from his private income, in a way that would leave no doubt what his personal salary is. But there is only one man who could do that for us at present—the Inspector of Taxes—and he mustn't tell! But it is surely beautiful to contemplate the pleasure with which he must open, twice a year, those rich envelopes from Lambeth; and perhaps even notice how much the National Church is providing, from its official endowments, towards supplying the national needs.

And now—for this matters most—what is the new Archbishop going to *say*? Fortunately we can have no doubt what Dr Temple's message is. It has been written with unmistakable clearness in a dozen books, presented with his unrivalled lucidity from a hundred platforms, and proclaimed far in many a broadcast. It is a message that goes deep, wide, and high; and none who has heard it will deny that here each of these epithets has its fullest meaning. It will admit of nothing lying outside the scope of the

Gospel, nor extending beyond the Gospel's range. It is a community message; and it is a message for the young. It is for a world in agony, as well as for human hearts in doubt and distress. It is just the full, fearless message of his Master.

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But we have yet to answer Virginia Woolf's question—"Is it easy, is it possible, for a good man to be an Archbishop?" And I am presumptuous enough to assert that I know exactly what Dr Temple's reply will be. It will be given, not only on his own behalf but also for the gracious and gifted lady, his full debt to whom only he can know. And it is—for, after all, even an Archbishop may still be allowed to take a text—Saint Paul's First Letter to the Thessalonians; the last chapter; verse twenty-five.

F. A. Iremonger.

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## The Importance of Niebuhr

Dr Reinhold Niebuhr, Professor of Christian Ethics at the Union Seminary, New York, is the most important English-speaking theologian of to-day. Others can do a good job in defence or exposition of existing theological traditions with an ethical and generally non-theological glance at the problems of existence raised by the human crisis of our time; but Niebuhr has an equipment which enables him to assess the very biggest currents of both Christian thought and secular theory from a position reached by a return to the sources of Christian experience and its theological expression. His work should therefore compel others to define their position or shift it to a definitely new centre. This has not happened in England in spite of a widespread acquaintance with Niebuhr's earlier writings. Theological and ecclesiastical eminence has read him, said that he must be taken into account, and passed by on the other side Its subsequent preachments and writing show not the slightest sign that it has been disturbed or resettled by the impact of this strong voice from over the Atlantic. On the other hand, a group of younger men claiming to represent a "Niebuhrian" school in this country have found inspiration and guidance in his thought, especially in the field of social criticism. But because they

were not standing in one of the robuster theological traditions when they were confronted with Niebuhr's mind, their influence has been less than it might have been had they some real theological nerve centres to be hit by it. It is too easy to use Niebuhr falsely for support in an eclectic, non-committal, superior, striking-all-round independence of actual church life and thought.

Half of Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures (1939) are now before us[1]; the second volume is promised within a year. This gap in publication is troublesome to a reviewer who is unwilling to assess prematurely the author's treatment of some subjects tantalizingly opened up in vol. i, in case vol. ii should allay some serious scruples. But it will do good if it leads to a real inward digestion of Niebuhr's exposition of the Christian view of " Human Nature " before the lectures on " Human Destiny " appear.

This is a book that should make theological and spiritual history. No one's thought or soul can be the same again who has listened to this man's penetrating voice. He has the scholar's sweep over the work of philosophers, political thinkers, Christian doctors and pagan seers; and he has the prophet's insight into the special predicament of man in our own day, showing that predicament as an acute variant of the perennial problem of man through the centuries. It makes the theologies of the past live, even those which are proved unsatisfactory; it redeems the pain of the modern soul from fatuity by linking it with the ceaseless striving of man, who never gives up the search for meaning in spite of awful setbacks. I have personally got from this book intellectual clarification, searchings and (I hope) purification of soul, and a chastened encouragement.

The clarification comes from Niebuhr's use of the Biblical view of man as both a creaturely part of nature and history and also a spiritual being with a unique link with God among creatures. By this test he examines secular philosophies, revolutionary movements and types of Christian thought. With a remarkable sureness of touch he shows where they explain away one or other of these two axioms of Christian anthropology. This leads to a delineation of the predicament of modern man and his culture. The classical idea of man was a form of rationalism which regarded reason as the constitutive principle, raising him

[1] *The Nature and Destiny of Man : A Christian Interpretation.* By Reinhold Niebuhr. Vol. I: Human Nature. (Nisbet, 15s.)

out of the limitations of the world process. This does justice to the fact that man transcends process, but it errs in making mind the essence of spirit, of which it is only one activity and not the central; and it errs in minimizing the finiteness of human life or treats it as a hindrance to be overcome. From the revival of this view modern man gets his arrogance. But there is a conflict between this view and another, which sees man as completely accounted for as part of the world. This naturalism also splits into two camps, one which apprehends nature rationally by science and another which treats man as essentially a drop in the stream of history or the life process. The uncertainty man feels in this unresolved confusion between idealism, naturalist rationalism and vitalist romanticism is marked by a dissipation of certainty about individuality and by an asserted certainty of the goodness of man, which contradicts the known facts of history and the Christian doctrine of sin. The book is, in fact, an extended essay in the connexion between loss of the self and loss of the sense of sin. No review can give a just impression of the competence with which Niebuhr handles the main lines of thought which have led to the modern predicament both in secular and Christian traditions, or to the way in which he shows how the main themes on the relation of vitality and form or eternity and time have led to loss of " the self." Hellenistic Christianity, German idealism, Marxist dialectics, state or race absolutism, romantic primitivism, are all arraigned as aberrations from the central paradox of man expressed in the Christian affirmations that man is in the image of God, yet a creature and a rebel. So are also the chief ecclesiastical traditions on the subject.

Niebuhr is at his best in contending for the ultimate nature of this paradoxical duality in man in contrast to all ideas which divide him in two or merge one element in the other. Against naturalist interpretations he affirms that " human nature has no animal impulse in its pure form "; there is always an activity of the spirit. Small work is made of all theories which regard sin as the lag of nature behind the spirit. Against the optimism of idealists he declares that " the self has a narrower (finite) base and a higher and narrower pinnacle of spirit than the breadth of perspective of its rational processes." The practical predicament of modern man is the sharp contradiction between his confidence in the individual and the destruction

of individuality which all three assumptions (naturalism, idealism and romanticism) bring about.

The Christian interpretation is that while man is both spirit and nature his human selfhood is not to be grasped in either term. He transcends nature by asking the meaning of his own life; the truth of rational views lies in their recognizing his power to stand back from the flux of process. (*Cf.* Prof. R. A. Wilson's *The Miraculous Birth of Language*, on language as the expression of "free mind" in man, introducing the element of permanence into a vanishing world.) But idealism, from Plato to Hegel, tends to regard man as an aspect of universal spirit. Niebuhr's critique here is particularly important in view of disillusioned Westerners like Aldous Huxley and, lately, Dr Kenneth Walker (*Diagnosis of Man*) seeking in Yoga a medicine for healing the wounds left by the superficialities of Western religious culture, and in view of the vogue of teachers like Meher Baba, who claim to dispel all spiritual ignorance. Mysticism has the merit, as Niebuhr shows, of realizing that spirit is beyond reason and beyond consciousness, but it too makes for loss of particularity in undifferentiated divinity. Though Niebuhr does not go so far as the late Paul Elmer More in holding that mysticism is ultimately nihilistic, he hardly does justice to that contribution of mysticism which insists that spirit is something beyond even self-consciousness. Be that as it may, further inquiry into the modern predicament should examine the prevalent danger of thinking that because there is an unconscious element below the mind (discovered by the psychologists), and also an element behind or above self-consciousness, therefore the two are the same—namely, the cosmic unconscious ("telluric" as Berdyaev calls it) and the spiritual super-conscious. This is probably the innermost error of modern romanticism, both political and religious.

*Contra* all attempts to rise "from the chaos of nature to the harmony of mind or to descend from the chaos of spirit to the harmony of nature" stands the Christian view of man as a finite creature and a self-transcendent spirit. The tension between his inescapable participation in the limited temporal order and his superiority to it is the *locus* of his relation to the living God. The stubborn fact of sin lies in man's refusal to respond in faith to the providence and love of the Creator which is offered to him in his temporal existence; he seeks to make absolute the finite and

determined character of his life in an attempt to escape from his finiteness. This attempt is only possible because his spirit transcends his temporal existence. But man also attempts to do away with the hard reality of his concrete limitations, and Niebuhr finds " the pathos of original sin in the pretensions of idealist thought." He rightly urges that only the spiritual creature can sin. Here he makes much use of Augustine in expounding the Biblical teaching of man's inner constitution and of Kierkegaard's insistence upon " this individual " as man confronted with the absolute.

In his searching treatment of the meaning of sin and of the easy conscience of modern man Niebuhr displays his dialectical powers to the full. Pride is the ultimate sin of the spiritual creature, a rebellion against his creaturely place. More insidious than pride of power and of knowledge which characterize political and intellectual movements is pride in moral and religious achievements or ideals. This pride can only be discovered by means of a religion of revelation " grounded in the faith that God speaks to man from beyond the highest pinnacle of the human spirit." Collective egoism, such as that of demonic cults of nation or class, is " man's last, and in some respects most pathetic, effort to deny the determinate and contingent character of his existence." In contrast to pride, the sin of sensuality is a form of self-love which seeks to escape from the pain of selfhood by giving some natural satisfaction an infinite value.

To be shown, with Niebuhr's guidance, the egoism and bias in all human activities, more especially those which are most altruistic and objective, is a real searching of soul. But this doctrine that all ways of life are sinful under the judgment of God leads to a hunger for direction in making relative moral judgments, personal and collective, between the better and worse in the actual world. For this direction Niebuhr offers us less in these lectures than he has given us in *Moral Man and Immoral Society* and in *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*. He shows, however, a critical appreciation of the Catholic Natural Law teaching and casuistry for their attempt to meet this need, but he dismisses them from real serviceability because they are " constantly insinuating religious absolutes into highly contingent and historic moral judgments." Protestantism (of the serious, not the liberal, variety), on the other hand, risks effacing all moral distinc-

tions in history by its conviction of undifferentiated sinfulness in all men. In Niebuhr's analysis the failure of both Catholic and Reformation teaching to come to grips with this problem is the religious side of the modern predicament which lies so centrally in the fact that " liberal " Christianity has avoided the kernel of the problem altogether.

There is a very fruitful development in Niebuhr's thought indicated in this volume which goes beyond that displayed in his earlier publications. It is his insight into the paradoxical nature of the inevitability of, and at the same time human responsibility for, sin. For this he is much indebted to Kierkegaard's conception of anxiety as the contrary of faith, which provides a key to the anomaly of both the necessary and accidental nature of sin. (In view of the inadequacy of " anxiety " as a translation of " Angst," why not " dread " which the American translators of Kierkegaard are using ?) Anxiety for security in " the dizziness of freedom " (Kierkegaard) leads to sin, but only if " the prior sin of unbelief is assumed " (Niebuhr). This discussion is supremely significant, because it goes a long way towards getting the dispute about the priority of " the right " or " the good " out of its recent deadlock. By shifting the imperative note from the content of conduct to faith, Kierkegaard opens a way out of the dispiriting familiar form in which the categorical imperative has been held, and Niebuhr's use of the idea of anxiety puts him in line with the theologians who have insisted on the priority of the " good," and that even in sin man seeks the good, though pervertedly. Without faith man cannot stand the dizziness of freedom, and then the good, which man always seeks, is surely interpreted in an egotistic and deterministic manner, as seen, *e.g.*, in one of the most entertaining attacks on the human race in recent times, that made by the other American, Mark Twain, in *What is Man ?*

While Niebuhr's exposition of the psychology of sin is most helpful, his assessment of the theological traditions concerning it is less conclusive. This volume closes with the question raised by the following situation. Catholic thought, being more concerned, as he thinks, with the problem of man's finitude than with that of sin, fails to do justice to the stubborn force of corruption which infects every human scheme, such as that of Natural Law. Theological Protestantism, on the other hand, is obsessed with the incursion of sinfulness into the highest places of human

achievement, but, after a short influence upon the world, has been displaced by the optimism of Renaissance origin which denies any fundamental contradiction in man. Both liberal geniality and Reformation pessimism, nevertheless, " explored complexities of human nature beyond the limits understood in the medieval synthesis." Niebuhr promises in his second volume to discuss the slide from Reformation to liberal views and to see how the two opposed insights can be brought into fruitful interrelation.

As that will be an attempted new synthesis it is permissible and necessary to raise the question whether Niebuhr has fully grasped the force of the (old) medieval synthesis which has broken up into two camps. In his treatment of original sin and *Justitia Originalis* he attempts a restatement of the relation of the essential nature of man and the effects of the Fall. He is particularly critical of the Catholic view that original sin has deprived man of a *donum supernaturale*, and he contends, too, that original justice has not been entirely forfeited. Yet he recognizes the necessity for a distinction, " properly limited and safeguarded," between the *pura naturalia* and the *donum superadditum*. The development of this theme is apparently left over for vol. ii. One does not need to be a Thomist to feel that Niebuhr's refusal to separate the essential nature of man, which is not lost, from the original righteousness, which is lost, according to Catholic theology, has not penetrated to the centre of the Catholic concern on the subject. His treatment here is a little too much an intellectual discussion of formulations. The differences between Bonaventura, Alexander of Hales, and Aquinas, for example, are ignored; he tends to attribute the same meaning to sanctifying grace and to original righteousness. When he makes his own reformulation of original justice in terms of the theological virtues, and distinguishes the essential nature of man from the virtue of conformity to that nature, he is struggling with the same facts which Catholicism tries to handle in terms of nature and grace. It can be admitted that the traditional scheme is not philosophically faultless, but Niebuhr admits that neither is his own presentation of Biblical doctrine. And if he had made use of the Catholic distinction between the two kinds of supernatural grace, sanctifying grace and *gratia gratis data*, which gives integrity in original justice, but is not essentially sanctifying, he might have found less to

correct than he thinks necessary. As it is, he hardly comes to grips with the ultimate riddle which the theology of pure nature and the supernatural gift tries to face—namely, that the mystery of the Fall can only be expressed in a way which regards it as transgressing some precept not directly bound up with man's nature, but superadded to it. (Niebuhr does hold pride to be prior to sensuality and calls it the breaking of an external harmony.) The two-story theory of man's hypothetical innocence may be unsatisfactory and require an entirely new idiom, but it does face the question: how can man be *vulneratus in naturalibus* and yet not lose the *humanum* which belongs to the *Imago Dei*? Niebuhr is willing to leave the question as part of the postulate of human freedom, and certainly we are here in the thick of confusion about the meaning of *natura*. But by leaving the question there he has no surer reason for saying that knowledge of God is more an essential part of man's nature than his sinfulness. It is the constant difficulty of all Fall doctrines. Niebuhr gets us a little further than Brunner (*Man in Revolt*, Appendix I). Maybe explanation is out of place in these abysses of the spirit, but, if not, a deepened understanding of the perhaps clumsy *natura* and *dona* theology is the only alternative to the curious and baffling way Berdyaev gets out of the difficulty by positing freedom behind being and not-being behind freedom (*Destiny of Man*, etc.).

It will be interesting to see whether Anglican theology will be shaken into some serious attempt to find its orientation by this important work of Niebuhr's. All the main strands that jostle in bewilderment within the orbit of " the Anglican mind " are somewhere delineated and identified in these lectures under their more general parentages. We Anglicans have been bidden to cultivate Greek theology to correct the psychological bias of Latin theology; then we are advised that Greek theology is too humanist and we must return to the Bible. Our older and better educated teachers have more than a life's job in seeing how the New Testament fits or does not fit the categories they imbibed in their university years—Greek metaphysics, Hegelian idealism, with a streak or two of scientific rationalism and the tale ends of evolutionary monism; the younger and more vocal spokesmen too often teach a doctrine of the spirit that is in effect a form of vitalism, suggesting that spirit is the life energy at its highest. The Incarnation is still accounted for as the

high-water mark of human development, men are encouraged by talk about the infinite possibilities of the human soul, and sin is still to be heard referred to as the survival of the ape and the tiger. Besides provoking us to clear up some of this mess, Niebuhr's work should have the subsidiary result of arousing again serious acquaintance with the greatest Christian classics. For instance, even what he has given us from Augustine should stimulate many clergy to learn something of Augustine's positive affirmations over and above the controversy with the Pelagians, which is about all they learnt in college.

If definiteness in the theology of the Anglican communion is to be commensurate with its sense of being a Church, nothing could be better than the imposition of an examination upon all teaching and preaching pastors in the subject matter of these Giffords.

(There is a misprint on p. 247, penult. line: " he " for " we" ; and the same quotation from Aquinas is given on pp. 263 and 283.)

V. A. Demant.

## Love and Marriage—II

To conclude this paper, the first part of which was concerned with Love as an historical phenomenon, I want to consider in greater detail one or two of the significant points to which passing reference has already been made.

In the first place, what was the " Perfection " which Dante saw in Beatrice and, because the experience is a normal one, which innumerable lovers see in each other? Clearly it cannot be an absolute perfection, but only such a perfection as contingent, creaturely beings can possess and apprehend; clearly, too, it cannot be an aggregate of individual creaturely perfections, for this, in a single person, would be so rare as to invalidate any argument which asserted that a view of perfection is a normal experience of lovers. Yet the Spirit vouchsafes to man a proper kind of self-knowledge, so that, according to his capacity, he apprehends intuitively, not only Divine perfection as against his creaturely imperfection, but also, in the light of that Divine perfection, the degree to which, potentially, he can approximate to it. He realizes what, by the grace of God, he can become. Now this implies an integration of per-

sonality which involves a creaturely perfection of balance between the three loves—*eros*, *philia*, and *agape* (whether on the natural plane, where *agape* can only exist analogically, or on the supernatural plane)—and the intuition that such a balance is subjectively possible leads to its being sought objectively in another.

In this lies that mystery of Love which is integral to the Gospel of Creation. It was not good, said God, that man should be alone, so out of the sleeping Adam's side He fashioned the companion to whom man must cleave; by whom, in a mutual self-giving of the whole life and personality, symbolized in a single act, his incompleteness might be repaired, as hers by him—for from his flesh she was created, and one " flesh " they must become. So is set forth mythologically the mystery of that bond of attraction which God has ordained as the foundation of the basic human community; this is the impulse under which man and woman perceive intuitively in each other that perfection which is potentially in themselves. To fall in Love, therefore, is in one sense to perceive intuitively in another the prophecy (though one does not so recognize it) of the creaturely perfection which is potentially in oneself, a perfection which reflects to His glory that absolute perfection which is in God's being.

To see in potentiality such creaturely perfection is to desire it, and to desire it with the whole personality; there is an outgoing of *eros* and *philia* corresponding to the physical and mental perfections perceived, and, overruling and conditioning them, *agape*. This outgoing may or may not be mutual: that depends on the situation. This, ideally, is " falling in Love "; but what so often happens is that sex polarization is conditioned, not by the overruling of *eros* by natural or supernatural *agape*, but by *eros* (or more rarely *philia*, or both in combination) dominating the situation. The potential perfection of a whole personality is not desired—indeed, is not often perceived—but there is merely a movement towards the satisfaction of selfish desires by concentration on that particular element in the personality of the one " loved " which is able to minister to those desires.[1] Hence the relation between the perfection of the

[1] It should be understood that this " erotic " desire, although " selfish," is not in itself wrong—in fact, it is necessary for complete Love, since it is " determined by an existing value in its object, and therefore seeks satisfaction in the possession of what has value for the

creature and the perfection of the Creator, essential in true Love, is absent; the glory, if it exists, is man's, not God's.

It is in this concentration on certain aspects only of the personality that the ancient and Patristic attitudes to Love were defective, as was also Romantic or Courtly love in the phase in which any consummation was avoided. The low status of women, and the low valuation of love and marriage which usually accompanies it, are seen, therefore, to spring from a denial to women of the dignity of full human personality, and, consequently, of the right to the entirety of a man's love. Love demands the surrender by each to the other of the whole personality, that each may receive it back integrated and enriched.

Essentially, then, this " Perfection " is seen as potential: " I love her as God made her to be." So when M. de Rougemont says,[1] " To choose a woman for wife is to say to Miss So-and-so, ' I want to live with you just as you are,' " this " just as you are " means for him who has seen the Vision and the Glory " just as I see you to be in the potential perfection which is your real self." People may say, as they do, " What can he see in her ?" The answer to them is, " You see her as she is, superficially; he, by grace, what she by grace may become." Of this view of the Beloved's perfection there is another consequence: like Dante, the Lover becomes " for one moment that Perfection which he has observed. . . ." He attains a momentary actualization of that potential perfection in himself, the equivalent of which he has already seen in the Beloved, though he has still " to become by his own will the caritas which was by God's will awakened in him . . . by her."[2]

Yet, again, another aspect of the Vision can be detected —there is seen the perfection of the coinherence in Love. Man and woman are not only in some sense incomplete; each is also androgynous. In the personality of each there is always being fought out a deep-seated conflict of opposites,

self " (Burnaby: *Amor Dei*, p. 16), and must therefore be as characteristic of love for God as of Love for one of the opposite sex. It becomes wrong only when it is entirely egocentric and present to the exclusion of all other forms of love. To quote Burnaby again (*ibid.*, p. 309), " If you are really ' in love,' you are not preoccupied with the satisfaction of your own need. You believe that you have found something supremely worthy to receive the best you can give, something that demands from you a complete devotion. . . ."

[1] *Passion and Society*, p. 314.

[2] Charles Williams: *Religion and Love in Dante*, pp. 10 and 12.

masculine against feminine, and this conflict is never, in the individual, entirely resolved. But union in Love brings a realization of the true androgynous image in both Lover and Beloved; it converts the tension of strife between the antagonistic elements into a tension of repose.

Finally, this " Perfection " has a certain theological importance apart from the various aspects of it which have already been mentioned. Man attains in a limited way a knowledge of God through His works, and especially through man himself, made in the image of God, particularly when that image has been restored by grace. The Beloved's perfection is therefore a reflection of the absolute perfection of God; because of the particularity of Love, she appears to the Lover not as *an* image of God, but (for him) *the* image of God. For this particularity there would seem to be a reason in the Divine economy. God has so made man that not only is it his nature (normally) to fall in Love, but also through that falling in Love alone can he normally apprehend certain of God's perfections. To true Lovers is vouchsafed a particular Vision of God at the beginning of the Way along which they may, if they will, journey towards Him. In the treading of this Way, too, there is implied another aspect of " Perfection." Just as the perfection of Christ, and of His union with the Church—itself signified in marriage—is not merely to be viewed, but primarily to be experienced through the living relationship of the members with the Head, so the perfection of the Beloved—analogous here to the perfection of God known supernaturally by grace—is not merely to be looked upon, but rather to be experienced in the living relationship of Love, in the power of the *caritas* mutually communicated to each other by Lover and Beloved as a result of the perfection they have recognized.

Such, briefly, are some of the implications of this significant Moment of Love, from which essentially must begin any approach to marriage, if there is to be an understanding of its nature and peculiar problems. But it is none the less important to recognize that it is a " moment." Falling in Love means an immediate but by no means necessarily permanent transformation of values; the Vision is seen and then often seems to be withdrawn. Love therefore implies a high fidelity to the Vision and the communicated Glory during what Mr Charles Williams calls the " Dark Night " of the " Way of Sanctity " which is marriage—a fidelity

which is living and positive until the Lover becomes the Love he has seen.

This fidelity, through the grace to which it bears witness, is the only assurance that Love will be able to withstand the disintegrating power of sin. So long as fidelity to the Vision remains (and therefore fidelity to the Beloved through whom it came, and to God, from whom it came and whose perfection it reflects), so long will the assaults of sin prove ineffectual. But once let grace be refused and the Vision denied, and Love will cease to be. Mistakes there may be, and for them " there is pardon and grace; for the deliberate and continued perversion of (the Way of Love) there can be, by the nature of things, no pardon—' neither here nor in the world to come.' "[1] So far Love has been considered as an experience integral to the Gospel of Creation, and it is therefore essential to recognize, such is the power of sin in our fallen natures, that it is only by God's grace that integration in Love can be preserved. And if those who have seen the Vision can sin, what of those who have not seen it? Here we find ourselves face to face with one of the fundamental problems of marriage: fidelity is not of one kind, nor is it superficial. It means fidelity to the Vision from the moment of the Vision, whether marriage is immediate or not; fidelity moment by moment, not in deed only, but in word and thought. In how many marriages is an outward unity preserved alongside a deliberate acquiescence in the loss of the Vision or, worse, its deliberate betrayal? This lack of fidelity to the Vision because of sin is a central element in so many marriage failures; and where there has been no Vision at all, no more than a superficial measure of success can possibly be expected.

It follows that any such dichotomy of Love as seems nowadays generally to be acquiesced in, and to which convention and art minister, is both untrue and dangerous. There cannot be Love *and* marriage: there can be no hiatus separating the " romantic " from the commonplace and the exciting from the dull. Marriage cannot be understood except as Love: Love must be accepted as nothing else, in the providence of God, than the ontological basis of marriage. To assert this is not to advertise any easy solution for the problems which must necessarily attend the conjunction of two " wills to power," nor to conceal from those in Love

[1] Charles Williams: *Religion and Love in Dante*, p. 21.

that even in the marriage grounded in Love there will still be many difficult personal adjustments. It is rather to assert that there is only one plane upon which the problems of marriage can be tackled with any assurance of success. The dichotomy must cease: there must be a clear distinction between the ontological reality of Love and the conventions and sanctions imposed by society in its intrusion into what is essentially " the most intimate and individual aspect of human personality."[1] There must also be a recovery of the proper attitude towards Love: it must be freed from sentimentality, from exaggerated and perverted idealism, and from all nominal association with erotic sensuality, whether heterosexual or homosexual; there must be a fearless reversion to the use of the word " lust." Love must be affirmed and proclaimed as a mystery, integral to the Gospel of Creation, eternal and indissoluble, constitutive of the basic human community, yet in itself suprasocial.

Love so viewed must be tragic: tragic because a relationship so intimate and individual cannot be worked out in secret, but always involves in some way the intervention of the community; because, though Love, it nevertheless involves a clash of personalities, and is not immune from failure or betrayal; because there is a vision of something eternal, of the Things Beyond, for the realization of which, in the midst of temporality, the Lover and the Beloved must strive. Glory there is, the glory of a high human destiny, but it is the glory of those things which are passing away; in heaven there is neither marrying nor giving in marriage. But here on earth there is joy in the midst of the tragedy, joy in the realization of personal integration through selfless giving and undeserved receiving.

There is need of a new Movement of the Spirit in these times, asserting the reality and the ontology of Love, as the Medieval movement asserted its very existence. What was then the work of the poets may well now be the task of the theologian and the sociologist. For in Love the emphasis is entirely upon personality and individuality, and any totalitarian or collectivist system which subordinates men and women to an abstraction like the state degrades or destroys Love just as surely as did the subjection of women in ancient and medieval times. But it is not enough merely to preserve personality: the nature of the relationship

[1] Berdyaev: *The Destiny of Man*, p. 299.

in which it is most fully to be exercised must be clearly understood. It is not sufficient to regard Love as an intermediate, probationary state, which is superseded rather than fulfilled in marriage: this is to give marriage a fictitious superiority which it does not absolutely possess, and can only result in a depreciation or misunderstanding of Love which cannot but have in turn pronounced effects upon the attitude to marriage. In so far as Love and marriage can be separated, Love may be said to be fulfilled in marriage; and in so far as marriage cannot be the normal and immediate consequence of falling in Love, some sort of superiority must be conceded to it. All that it is necessary to realize is that the separation in time of falling in Love and marriage is contingent, and not necessary, to the relationship. Marriage, in short, must not be exalted at the expense of Love, but Love must be raised to the level of marriage, and regarded with the seriousness it demands. The ontological relation between Love and marriage must never be confused with the actual relation at any one particular time; for instance, the modern situation imposes upon those in Love, for economic, conventional, and other reasons, a period of courtship or "engagement," which means that the consummation of their Love must attend upon circumstances, but it is the circumstances, and not anything inherent in the relationship as such, which impose the restriction. This is part of the tragedy of Love, and because of it there must be personal adjustments. Nevertheless, marriage is in reality but a stage—at present a very necessary stage—in a Way which has already begun: if it is not, then when it does take place it is only a sort of permitted cohabitation without any ontological basis. The essential connexion between Love and marriage must be preserved, and so must the unique nature and significance of marriage—but not at the expense of the proportion of relationship. Marriage is a stage in the Way which is entered from the moment (not necessarily or usually at the first encounter, though this cannot be precluded) when Lover and Beloved recognize and respond to a potential perfection seen by each in the other, and have thereby communicated to themselves an intuitive and subjective apprehension of their individual perfections and of God's absolute perfection. Once entered, this Way is trodden by them secretly and apart: society can only recognize as valid, and the Church bless as sacramental, the vital and

intimate union which has flamed into existence.[1] For, from the moment when a man and woman have fallen in Love and are *in* Love, there is present in potentiality all Love's high analogical and comprehensive relation to the Christian mysteries.[2] They have set foot in the Way; theirs are now its privileges and its responsibilities, its joys and its tragedy. For them is the glory of the Vision, and for them also the " Dark Night " of its withdrawal; they have received each other at the hand of God, of whom they are images, and from whom is their vocation. It is the reality and the responsibility of this Way that need all possible emphasis: the end must be seen in the beginning; there must be no dichotomy. Courtship and marriage are not separate and distinct, but one great experience. In these times two aspects of the same Love—Love-as-courtship and Love-as-marriage—are presented to men and women: both are aspects of the one love which is God's gift to them, and this Love must be treated with the seriousness and responsibility which any gift of God demands. To proclaim the ontological nature of this Love will be to make a powerful attack upon the problems and abuses of marriage as we know it to-day, and at the same time will impress upon those to whom this great gift has come, or may come, the responsibility with which it must be used.

Sherwin Bailey.

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## The Film Version of Shaw's "Major Barbara"

The film version of Bernard Shaw's *Major Barbara*, which is described as having been prepared under Shaw's supervision, raises interesting points which are not so immediately apparent in the play. While the play has for a long while

[1] To say this is in no way to depreciate the parts which Church and State must play in connexion with marriage. If those in Love are Christians, the marriage which consummates their Love must bring them into a new relationship with their fellows in Christ—hence the witness to their union which they bear before the congregation. In any case, as members of a human society, their union is of consequence to that society and needs to be openly acknowledged and their vows ratified. It is difficult to avoid what may at first seem exaggeration when stressing the necessarily ontological nature of Love, and this should be borne in mind in connexion with this paragraph.

[2] See Doms: *The Meaning of Marriage, passim.*

been regarded as an exposition of the dilemmas of those who seek to finance Christian enterprises with funds secured from the profits of what used to be called " the armaments ring," the film suggests more profound questionings about the integrity of Christian actions when performed on a professional basis, and about the nature of the essential limitations imposed by " things as they are," limitations which are neglected at their peril by those who desire to make " things as they are " approximate more closely to " things as they ought to be."

## I

It all arises out of the conversion of Barbara, or the new insight which she receives into the nature of social action, as the result of her dealings with her armament-king father, Andrew Undershaft.

Barbara, daughter of Andrew Undershaft and his wife, Lady Britomart, grand-daughter of the Earl of Stevenage, gets taken up with the work of the Salvation Army. We first meet her as a Major in charge of one of the Salvation Army's shelters in the East End of London. A financial crisis is pending, but just at the same time as the General, Mrs Baines, arrives to tell Barbara that there is grave danger that her work will have to close down, Undershaft also arrives to see something of the work his daughter is doing.

Shaw portrays Undershaft as very unlike the " typical " armaments king of popular imagination. He is cultured, thoughtful and ironic. He understands Barbara more profoundly than she understands herself. In many ways, in the film, he is not so much a flesh-and-blood character as the embodiment of that ultimate necessity within things which is a part of the essential wisdom. He is not unlike Satan in the medieval mystery plays or, for that matter, in the Book of Job.

Nevertheless, he is capable of acting in an entirely flesh-and-blood manner when the occasion arises, as he does when, in order to save the Army's finances (and to make Lord Saxmundham, formerly Bodger, the whisky distiller, pay up a conditional gift which he has offered), he pays up the rest of the sum which they require.

The authorities of the Army do the normal thing: they accept the money. In this they do nothing which can, on

their assumptions, which are also the assumptions of average Christian charity, be justly condemned. For, as Shaw rightly points out in the preface to the play, " we must either share the world's guilt or go to another planet." The failure of the Army—and it should be remembered that it stands here for all socio-religious activity in general—is that it has allowed itself to be manœuvred into a false position, where salvation has become a purely individualist concern, very largely identified with emotional release, and hardly at all identified with the integration of the individual into society, as a phase of the whole activity of the Spirit in the Church, which is the integration of society itself in God.

This one-sided emphasis inevitably produced an equally one-sided reaction, and in consequence we have had the warfare between the advocates of the gospel of personal salvation and the advocates of the " social gospel." Both were unreal. Neither of them secured a totally " saved " situation in which there is that reconciliation of self, God and society which is salvation at its fullest. They were unreal because they dealt with unreal abstractions of the real man. Neither " man as a spiritual being " nor " man as a social being " is a real man.

This point Barbara sees, in its negative aspect, in the scenes which close the first main phase of the film. The general principle is made concrete for her in an actual situation. Bill Walker, an East End tough, and one of the more attractive characters of the film, had come to the shelter to claim his girl who had been converted through the Army's influences. He fails to find her, but is himself nearly converted by the way in which Barbara moves his conscience, of which, in spite of his toughness, he has plenty, after he has assaulted a young Army officer, Jenny Hill. He tries hard to salve his conscience, even going as far as a fruitless effort to get himself assaulted in turn and, this failing, he attempts to make an atonement for his brutality by giving £1, half his total savings, to the Army for their work.

Barbara refuses to accept it. " We want your soul, Bill," she says, " and nothing less." Then, to her mortification and ultimate disillusionment, only a few minutes later Mrs Baines accepts Undershaft's £5,000 without any questions raised as to its donor's spiritual state. Nor, on her assumptions, should it be questioned. She is leading a vast movement for the moral and social regeneration of the poor,

and Undershaft has come along at a critical moment and made it possible financially for her work to continue.

It is important, in the light of this, to notice with some precision what it was in the transaction against which Barbara rebelled. It is only superficially a revolt on her part against the acceptance by the Army of " tainted money." In the light of her subsequent development we shall see that, underlying this, which is as much as she was able to see at the moment, there was a much more profound matter, a growing realization that the whole of the Army's work was on a false basis.

The episode of Undershaft's donation concludes the first principal theme of the film.

## II

There follows a short interlude in which Undershaft and Adolphus Cussins, Barbara's fiancé, figure as the principal characters. Cussins has joined the Army out of his infatuation for Barbara. He is quite candid about it, and sustains the part of a kind of ironic chorus as the plot unfolds. This interlude does not appear in the play as published, and a considerable amount of extra matter, not in the original play itself, has been incorporated into the film version at this point. The chief effect of this interlude is to make clear that, so far as the film is concerned, the principal theme is that of the testing of Barbara. Emphasis is laid upon the fact of Undershaft's care for her, and upon his fundamental understanding of her character and her dilemma, although as persons they seem poles apart. This is an additional indication that, as we have already noticed, Undershaft is, far more than anything else, the " adversary " through whose testing Barbara is to arrive at the fulness of her moral stature.

## III

The third section of the film, and its second principal theme, opens with Barbara's resignation from the Army. At the family breakfast-table the next morning plans are made for a large party of them to visit the great works of Undershaft and Lazarus at Perivale St Andrew. Barbara sets out with the rest of the party, clearly feeling that she is about to enter the heart of the enemy's citadel. The others, who are social snobs, regard the works as at best a regrettable necessity. But Barbara hates them, seeing in

them at the moment the influence which has dragged down the Army from its highest ideals. She still loves the Army, even though she has left it.

On the way to the works Barbara travels with her father in his car. She has been voicing her despair. Undershaft replies: " You have learned something. That always feels at first as if you had lost something." This marks a turning point in Barbara's development. She replies: " Well, take me to the factory of death, and let me learn something more. There must be some truth or other behind all this frightful irony." At first it was clear that she was going to the works as to the heart of the enemy's camp. Now she makes up her mind to go in the spirit of a learner.

## IV

The argument which we are seeking to develop is that this is not merely a film about the interactions of two interesting social phenomena, the Salvation Army and the arms industry. It is in the tradition of the morality play, and the principal characters and situations are the external dramatization of Barbara's spiritual consciousness. Barbara herself represents the Christian who is truly devout and eager, but who is also a thoughtful person and who knows that he must live on earth within the kingdoms of this world if he is to live at all. Consequently the Salvation Army and the arms industry appear to have been chosen by Shaw because they represent extreme types of the two necessary forces of social being, the force which makes for dynamic change and the force, which is no less a force for being inert, the force of necessity, the givenness within which all earthly activity must take place.

Barbara at this stage is moving towards acceptance of this human necessity in the form of the works at Perivale St Andrew. The film, far more than the text of the play, emphasizes the social significance of the works, even though, doubtless because of the limitations of its technique, it has to throw the external forms of it into undue prominence. We are shown a happy, free, prosperous and contented community life, and we see all the visitors duly impressed, and even deeply moved, by the things which they are shown. They are only true to their characters if they see all the wrong things, or perhaps see it all on a superficial level. " Did you see the nursing home, the libraries, the

schools, the ballroom and the banqueting chamber in the Town Hall? Have you gone into the insurance fund, the pensions fund, the building society, the various applications of co-operation?" And yet such things may not be on such a superficial level after all. In the theme which Shaw is developing they have a very real significance and importance; for they not only stand for a high level of comfort and for the amenities of life; they stand also for that which the Army and all it represents (and it represents all conventional religious activity) can never give to men, not because of any reluctance to give, or of any incapacity to do so, should it turn its energies that way. The conventional religious forces can never give these things if they are true to their expressed nature, because it is not part of that nature for them to do so. These amenities stand for a proper integration to the factual things of life which a man must have before he can have a real independence of his own, and when Reality has become divided such things belong to the realm of nature rather than the realm of grace.

But this independence a man must have, if ever, through learning to use it rightly, he is to come to know the full significance of his manhood. And the things which Barbara begins to see now, with all the clarity of a conversion experience, is that her message is not to men and women who are merely in the bondage of emotional disorders, or who are the victims of a disordered social system, the wrecks and outcasts who drifted into her shelter in the East End. She sees that her message is to the normal, average person, the person who really makes up society and who by the fundamental paradox of human nature is liable, on a basis of purely human living, to be in bondage to those very forces which have secured for him as much precarious freedom as that which he now enjoys.

A remark of Undershaft's, in which he betrays his own consciousness of this paradox, helps Barbara to see it also, and determines her on her next immediate steps. Undershaft is referring to the amenities which a man in his works enjoys, and contrasts his lot with that of a convert in Barbara's shelter. She has replied that a man who has received these amenities will not necessarily be the better for them. Her father answers: "You know he will. He will be better fed, better housed, better clothed, better behaved; and his children will be pounds heavier and bigger.

. . . It is cheap work converting starving men with a Bible in one hand and a slice of bread in the other. I will undertake to convert West Ham to Mohammedanism on the same terms." And then he adds the sentence which represents to the full material necessity's awareness of its own unfulfilled need: " Try your hand on *my* men; their souls are hungry because their bodies are full."

Barbara for her part accepts his invitation. She accepts it because she realizes that while there is indeed a freedom here which contrasts vividly with the false freedom of her Army converts in the East End, it is also an incomplete freedom (and an incomplete freedom is a partial bondage) which can only be made truly free when it is matched with that creative Christian way which had failed in the Salvation Army shelter, not because the " way " was false, but because the setting in which it sought to operate was a false setting. She sees at last how her fundamental convictions can now be used in a new and more genuine social setting, thus securing for themselves that self-consistent expression which they were unable to secure in the false and patronage-ridden atmosphere of the shelter.

Barbara also realizes that even in her Army phase she had been reaching towards that which the Army, in its given social context, could not provide. " And I never wanted," she says, " to shirk my share of whatever evil must be endured, whether it be of sin or suffering." In fact, she never wanted to shirk any share of the total experience of life. As she surveys her father's works she bursts out: " After all, my dear old mother has more sense than any of you. I felt like her when I saw this place—felt that I must have it—that never, never, never could I let it go; only she thought it was the houses and the kitchen ranges and the linen and the china, when it was really all the human souls to be saved; not weak souls in starved bodies, crying with gratitude for a scrap of bread and treacle, but fulfilled, quarrelsome, snobbish, uppish creatures, all standing on their little rights and dignities. . . . That is where salvation is really wanted."

And so she moves forward towards the climax. " My father shall never throw it in my teeth again that my converts were bribed with bread. I have got rid of the bribe of bread. I have got rid of the bribe of heaven. Let God's work be done for its own sake: the work He had to create us to do because it cannot be done except by living

men and women." Cussins interposes the rather forced comment that, in that case, the way of life lies through the factory of death. "Yes," Barbara replies, "through the raising of hell to heaven and of man to God, through the unveiling of an eternal light in the Valley of the Shadow." And then she continues: "Did you think my courage would never come back? Did you believe that I was a deserter? That I, who have stood in the streets, and taken my people to my heart, and talked of the holiest and greatest things with them, could ever turn back and chatter foolishly to fashionable people about nothing in a drawing-room? Never, never, never; Major Barbara will die with the colours."

## V

The play closes on this high note of inspiration and there is only a hint of a final step towards integration, which is made much more apparent in the film. Barbara's final speech might in itself be no more than an expression of joy on the part of a social worker who, thwarted in one direction, has found a new field for the exercise of her activities. But the final shots of the film show that Undershaft's workmanship has been more thorough than that, and that Barbara has found, not a new field for her activities, but a new interpretation of what those activities are. For we see her and Cussins joining in the stream of workpeople in Undershaft's factory and striding off with them, not to run welfare work for them, but to work with them and as a part of them, radically transformed not only in their emotions so much as in their entire social context.

In the earlier part of the film we noticed Bill Walker, the East End tough, dependent emotionally and economically upon the world of patronage, consciously inferior to his environment and rebelling against it. Barbara and he were obviously two very genuine people, but the artificiality of their environment held them apart from each other and in two opposite camps. Now as she and Cussins step out of Undershaft's office to begin their life as employees in the works, Bill Walker appears again. No longer out of work, but a lorry driver earning good money, independent and self-reliant, he drives by in his lorry. Recognizing Barbara, he waves to her and Barbara waves back to him; it is an exchange of greetings between friends. Barbara's true integration is now established, and in her new social setting

she will not have the money at her disposal with which to buy repentance and to spoil her work. But she will have the respect and comradeship of people who are economically free and socially independent. Their souls can now be genuinely hungry, as Undershaft said they would be, and Barbara still has her supreme contribution to make to their ultimate happiness, "the raising of hell to heaven and of man to God." She is free now and equipped for that task. She has shed her false positions, social, economic and religious, and in so doing has discovered her real power and her real mission. Her conversion is complete.

There are obvious deductions to be made from all this, for it has a great deal to suggest to us about Christian action, about that which we call "evangelism," and about the strength and weakness of whole-time Christian workers as opposed to those who, like St Paul, combine their apostolate with their tent-making. These are all matters which need careful consideration. It is quite possible that one of the gravest weaknesses of organized religion at the present day is that it has allowed itself to have got into a false social and economic position in which even its best and most selfless efforts are cramped and stultified.

It is sufficient for the present to end on a note of gratitude to the film industry, which here, as elsewhere, has used the medium of the screen to bring home to the general public spiritual, social and personal issues of the most far-reaching significance.

R. C. Thompson.

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A correspondent in Northern Ireland writes on March 24:

"I have just been reading *The Guardian* of March 20, and have perused with interest and a little bewilderment the prayer which your Archbishops have set forth for next Sunday, 'to be said slowly clause by clause.' I hope Theology will comment on it. It prays God through the courage and sacrifice of all (members of our and our allies' forces, etc.) to reveal and bring to pass the new heaven and new earth. Surely this is pushing the hope of a new order a bit too far. To expect a better ordering of society as a result of our efforts and sacrifices may be reasonable enough, but a new heaven and a new earth? Have Their Graces confused the Peace Conference which will end this war with the Day of Judgment?"

# MISCELLANEA

## OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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## ARCHIEPISCOPAL MANNERS

[From the Chronicle of Gervase, a monk of Canterbury. A Church Council held in Westminster Abbey (A.D. 1176) brought to a head the inveterate rivalry for precedence between the sees of Canterbury and York.]

"In the month of March, about Mid-Lent, the king came to London with his son Henry and the Lord Uguccione, Legate of the Pope, who purposed to call together the clergy of England and hold a Council. When therefore the Papal Legate had taken his seat on a raised throne in the midst, and Richard Archbishop of Canterbury, by right of his primacy, had sat down on his right, then Roger Archbishop of York, puffed up with his own innate arrogance to reject the left-hand throne that was destined for him, strove irreverently to sit down between the Legate and his Grace of Canterbury, thrusting with the more uncomely quarters of his body so that he sat down on the lap of his own Primate. Yet scarce had he struck my Lord of Canterbury with that elbow of his wherewith he had been accustomed to fight, when he was ignominiously seized by certain bishops, clerics, and laymen, and torn from the Archbishop's lap, and cast upon the floor. But, when staves and fists were now wielded on both sides, the Archbishop of Canterbury sprang up and returned good for evil, snatching away from this disastrous conflict his own rival and the inveterate enemy of his see. At length the contumacious Archbishop of York, rising from the pavement with his cape torn ignominiously by the struggle, fell down at the king's feet and belched forth lying calumnies against the Archbishop of Canterbury."—Quoted from G. G. Coulton, *Life in the Middle Ages* (1929), iii, 1.

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## REVISED REVIEWS—XV

The Scholastic Philosophy. By R. D. Hampden, Bishop of Hereford. Third Edition, 1848.

These Bampton Lectures by Dr Renn Dickson Hampden (1793-1868) were, as is well known, the centre of a considerable

controversy during the earlier stages of the Oxford Movement. As such, they are of some interest to the historian of the English Church, having been delivered in 1832, the year before the Movement is always considered to have started. But in themselves the lectures are not particularly attractive. It is a dead book, the author's intellectual position is such as would not now be found in any quarter, and even with the exercise of historical imagination it is not too easy to understand. While Dr Hampden accepts—and there is no reason whatever to question his sincerity—the official teaching of the Church, as he understands it, including the Creeds and the Articles of Religion, he writes as an extreme individualist and professes a species of nominalism and a distrust of " deductive logic " to a degree that is very hard to reconcile with any of the traditional statements of the Christian belief. He also exhibits a pathetic confidence in " Baconian induction " and, with him, " realism " is always a term of abuse. He holds that the Christian Faith consists in a number of what he calls " Divine Facts," interpreting the term " fact " in a very wide sense, to include, for instance, the Day of Judgment. But any comment upon these " facts " or any deduction from them is condemned as " scholasticism," under which term he regularly includes the whole theology of the patristic period as well as the medieval writers. A typical passage is found in the very first lecture: " The Scholastic Philosophy, in fact, lies between us at our present station in the world, and the immediate diffusion of the truth from heaven, as ' the morning spread on the mountains,' an atmosphere of mist through which the early beams of Divine Light have been transfused. It has given the celestial rays a divergency whilst it has transmitted them, and, by the multiplicity of its reflections, made them indistinct as to their origin." Every intellectual clarification, in fact, is really an obscuration of the simple facts of the Gospel, no matter from whom it comes. Thus, certain statements to be found within the New Testament itself, especially in the Pauline Epistles, are misunderstood if they are read, as perverse theologians have read them, as intellectual statements about God and the universe. " I appeal from the logical criticism of the Apostle's words to their Apostolical spirit—from Paul philosophizing to Paul preaching, and entreating, and persuading " (Lect. 8, p. 375). Or, again: " The more indistinct our language is on this sacred subject (justification)—the less of theoretic principle it embodies in it —the more closely do we imbibe the true spirit of Protestantism " (p. 257).

The eight lectures are written from this point of view. Perhaps in dealing with a work so little known nowadays it would be better to pay more attention to the actual contents than has been necessary in other books reviewed in this series, and the several lectures may be taken shortly in turn. To each lecture

is added an appendix where very considerable scholarship is shown in a long series of quotations from, chiefly, the Schoolmen proper in our sense of the term. The Greek Fathers are hardly quoted at all. It has indeed been suggested, with some probability, that these scholastic quotations are in part at least the work of Blanco White (1775-1841). One would hardly have expected so intimate a knowledge of St Thomas and the others in the Oxford of the thirties. The first and second lectures, then, purport to describe the origin and formation of this pernicious "scholastic philosophy," though elsewhere the lecturer protests that he does not use "scholasticism" as a term of abuse. But clearly in these lectures it is simply the perversion of the Gospel; no distinction is drawn between earlier and later writers; all are involved in one common condemnation. Their reasoning is throughout vitiated by "realism," which is specially reprobated; even Ockham was a "realist"! So far as one can see, "realism" means any belief in the inherent validity of human thought. As soon as we begin anywhere to argue from premises, we inevitably go wrong. Logic is "intrusive" (p. 90). Of course, as might be expected, the attack on "deduction" and "realism" is accompanied by much incidental complaint about the powers of ecclesiastics, and of Rome, in the usual style. The third lecture deals with the Trinitarian question. Here, again, all has been needlessly obscured by the intrusion of thought with its apparatus of technical terms—"Person," "Substance," and so forth. In a contemporary pamphlet Dr Pusey appositely remarks that even here, with the exception of a few unimportant lines from Gregory Nazianzen and a short reference to John of Damascus, the notes to this lecture consist of later Latin passages only. Lectures 4 and 5 discuss Pelagianism, Predestination and Grace. Exactly the same method is followed. All logical thought on these topics falls under condemnation. Just as Sabellius and others were "trinitarian" in their way, so also Pelagius has much to be said for him. He took, indeed, too superficial a view of the inveteracy of the sinfulness of human nature, but at least he gave a "moral" account thereof, while his opponents gave only a "physical or material" account of it, and Augustine was partially indebted to Plato into the bargain (p. 223). The next lecture, the sixth, deals with moral philosophy. Here Dr Hampden gives us a curious evaluation of the *Imitatio*. It is "a vigorous effort of that moral study which had been cultivated in the Church to extricate itself from the fetters of a systematic theology." Men wanted the ethics of *religion* and wanted the pure substance without the technical alloy with which it had been confounded (p. 278). Ethical science slumbered during the period of the Middle Ages. Plato, of all men, is "the villain of the piece"; his "noble and seductive language" was too strong a "temptation" to the

medieval Christian mind. But Aristotle also aided and abetted. The " De Officiis " of Ambrose and the " Morals " of Gregory the Great are alike tainted. " There was no proper attempt to establish a science of morals. It was only a transfusion of theological doctrine into the technical phraseology of the Ancient Ethics, in itself utterly barren of all sound instruction as to the foundation and nature of human duties " (p. 275). Even the " Consolatio " of Boethius is condemned with faint praise— " it tended to promote that contemplative religious character with which the moral philosophy of the Schools was tinctured at its outset " (*idem*). But it was " the spiritual power which the Latin Church had been acquiring over the consciences of men " that more than anything else contributed to " this confusion of Theology and Ethics." But still more evils were to come. Aristotle's preference for the contemplative life and the Christian version of that preference make " the rise of mysticism " and " the extravagances of fantastic piety " no matter of wonder (pp. 283, 284). Nor do the drawing up of lists of theological and of moral virtues escape due castigation; " scholasticism " is everywhere and taints everything.

The aberrations of certain modern philosophers who speak of " necessity " in morals are all derived from the same source; it is just the realism of the Schools over again ! Christianity and ethical science have really little or nothing to do with one another; " Christianity, in fact, leaves Ethical Science, as such, precisely where it found it " (p. 301). The seventh lecture deals with the sacraments. It is on the now familiar lines. There is not the slightest conception of a Church indwelt by the Spirit and guided into truth. The nature of the Eucharist is discussed and its supremacy among sacraments. Also the question of intention: it is right and proper that the unworthiness of the minister should not affect the value of the act he performs, but the Catholic reasons given for this doctrine " belong to the recondite philosophy of sacramental influence " (p. 324). As regards the " character " impressed by baptism and the usual teaching about heretical baptism, our author remarks that it " gave, in fact, to the Church a power over all who had once been baptized, whether within or without her pale; so that spiritual terrors might be applied to such persons, to compel them to the faith in which they had been baptized " (p. 326). In fact, scholasticism has left a mark in our own Church in the scrupulous care taken to ascertain whether baptism has already been received. The provision of conditional baptism is itself " scholastic." There is a discussion on transubstantiation and " matter and form," " substance and accident "—idols at once of religion and of philosophy. Transubstantiation cannot, however, be called an " absurd " doctrine if by that we mean " inconsistent with reason." It rests logically upon certain hypotheses, which our " present light in physical science " shows

to be untrue. Its popularity shows "how entirely subjugated the human understanding has been to the imperious reason of the Church leaders of the Middle Age" (p. 339). Hence also the attack upon Cartesianism in the Roman Church. Thus in the scholastic theory of the sacraments "the simplicity of Scripture truth has been altogether abandoned." The lecture ends with a contrast between the Scriptural account of the sacraments, simple and plain, and what scholasticism has evolved out of them, and with an appreciation of what we have gained at the Reformation—freedom from "the false comfort of that officious intercession of the sacramental system of the Latin Church" (p. 343). Men were then "unhappy without resource; their wounds were open, but there was none to heal." Yet we must be on our guard; there is a dangerous tendency to raise questions about baptism, for instance, and regeneration. The eighth and last lecture is on the "Nature and Use of Dogmatic Theology." The text is Jeremiah xxiii, 28, "The Chaff and the Wheat." This final discussion is "an arbitration of the point where Divine Truth ends and Human Truth commences" (p. 350). He repeats the old distinction between "simple facts divinely revealed" and theories founded upon them. As always in this book, an idea of a community divinely guided is totally absent. Tertullian is quoted as a witness to the "principle of Scholastic Theology" that "whatever is originally established as a point of doctrine is therefore true; whatever has subsequently arisen is corrupt," but its classical expression is found in the Vincentian canon. This canon, our author tells us, is accepted by some Protestants, but it is really a relic of the old philosophy of things purely metaphysical. It makes theology into an "exact" science, but "an assumption of the nature of Theology so erroneous naturally led to the assumption also of a test of its truth, founded on the fundamental misconception" (p. 355). Also "the candour, the fairness, the piety of the individual Christian was brought under the iron sway of speculative argumentation" (*ibid.*). So, while the Bible is inspired, theological corruption began from the very times of the Apostles; "the most wild theories were incorporated with Christianity." The Apostolic Fathers are no guides to follow; in fact, in the matter of theology later ages are an improvement upon the earlier in many instances. But the later writers are also often the more insidious; the fourth-century Fathers, for example, "incorporated their errors with the Gospel itself" (p. 362). "The cogency and perspicuity of logic are mistaken for the certain and clear discovery of religious truth" (p. 364). In dealing with heretics "the serpent-gaze of the subtile logician was still watching the tendency of all the efforts (of the heretical disputant) and bound him by an irresistible fascination to the spot from which he was anxious to escape" (p. 365)—apparently

the heretic was made a heretic by the theological method of the Church. In this confusion the nature of Scripture was entirely misunderstood; it was looked upon as a source of *doctrine*, but, " strictly to speak, in the Scripture itself there are no *doctrines* " (p. 374). Yet, in certain times and places a qualified approval may be given to doctrinal statements as " forms of exclusion " and relative not to " Christianity properly so called," but to " human Christianity," and hence we can accept, on this basis, " our Articles at large," and in particular " the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds." Of course, " the notions on which their several expressions are founded are both unphilosophical and unscriptural." They do not, however, " impress these notions on the Faith of the Christian as matters of affirmative belief "; they are just exclusive of other still more dangerous ideas. An excuse for their inclusion in our Prayer Book may be found in the fact that the Reformers had not, in their time, the benefit of Lord Bacon's exposition of the emptiness of the scholastic system. On this note the lectures end. A long Introduction of seventy-four pages is prefixed complaining of the reception of the lectures at Oxford and elsewhere, but it adds little or nothing to their contents. Of the somewhat numerous controversial brochures and pamphlets to which, as is not surprising, these lectures gave occasion, most are at this date boring reading. Those written on Dr Hampden's behalf do not seem to enter into the theological questions at all. Of those on the other side, by far the best is the booklet by Dr Pusey, *Dr Hampden's Theological Statements and the Thirty-Nine Articles Compared.* It shows real understanding and learning and is restrained in tone.

W. R. V. Brade.

## STUDIES IN TEXTS

" *He that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip; and he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one. . . . And they said, Lord, here are two swords. And he said unto them, It is enough.*"—St Luke xxii, 36, 38.

The cross of Christ was not confined to Calvary. He met it on the way to Capernaum, where His disciples had disputed as to who should be the greatest.[1] How much they had to learn ! He met it again in Samaria when James and John desired to consume the people with fire;[2] and He met it again in the " upper room " only a few hours before the Crucifixion. There He had told them of the coming storm and had warned them of the coming struggle. It is doubtful whether any passage of the Bible has played such an important part in the political history

[1] St Mark ix, 34. [2] St Luke ix, 54.

of Christendom as these words; and it is doubtful whether any other passage has been more misunderstood and misused.

Here we are not concerned with the ethics of war in general, but with the meaning of a particular passage of the gospel. Three questions confront us. The first is, What did our Lord mean by the charge, " let him sell his garment and buy a sword " ? The second, How came it to pass that the disciples were armed with two swords ? Third, What did our Lord mean by " It is enough " ?

Let us deal with the purchase of the sword first. If these words are to be taken literally, then it must be confessed that they stand absolutely alone and quite contrary to all the rest of Christ's teaching, and this was the view adopted by most of the early Fathers. John Cassian in the fifth century ridiculed those who would take these words literally, and compared them to those

" most earnest monks who had a zeal, but not according to knowledge, who understood literally St Luke xii, 35, and made wooden crosses and carried them about constantly; and were the cause, not of edification, but of ridicule by all who saw them."[1]

Likewise Chrysostom in the previous century:

" What is this ? He who said, ' If anyone strike you on the right cheek, turn unto him the other also,' now arms His disciples, and with a sword only. For if it were fitting to be completely armed, not only must a man possess a sword, but shield and helmet."

He then proceeds to point out the absurdity of a few fishermen, " brought up near lakes and rivers," offering armed resistance to " tyrants, allies, and nations," and concludes:

" We must not, then, suppose that He ordered them to possess swords, but by swords He points at the secret attack of the Jews."[2]

St Basil, writing about the same time, interpreted the words of our Lord as a prophecy and not as a command:

" but predicting that it should come to pass, that in truth the Apostles, forgetful of the time of the Passion, of the gifts and law of their Lord, would dare to take up the sword. For often does the Scripture make use of the imperative form of speech in the place of prophecy."[3]

St Cyril says that, although these words were addressed to the disciples, our Lord had the Jewish nation in mind ; for " the terrible attack of battle would overtake them and nothing would suffice to resist it. These things God prophesied concerning what should befall the country of the Jews; but the disciples

[1] " Works," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, xi, 376.
[2] Aquinas, *Catena Aurea*. St Luke xxii, 36.
[3] *Ibid.*

understood not the depth of His words, thinking they had need of swords against the coming attack of the traitor." St Ambrose spiritualized the sword and saw in it the power of the word of God, for which "you may sell your patrimony and clothe the nakedness of your soul." That the sword here referred to was "the sword of the Spirit" has been accepted by some modern writers. In the sixteenth century Europe's greatest scholar (Erasmus) poured scorn on those commentators who would "furnish out the disciples with halberts, spears and guns for the enterprise of preaching Christ crucified." Our Lord's command must be understood spiritually: "not with a carnal sword as rogues and highwaymen for murder and bloodshed, but with the sword of the Spirit";[1] and he rightly points out that only a short time after Jesus rebuked Peter for using the sword in His defence, which, according to some, He had strictly charged him to buy. "All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" was said only a few hours later.

It would, therefore, seem impossible to interpret Christ's words literally, and Augustine's explanation that

> "the Lord, indeed, had told His disciples to carry a sword; but He did not tell them to use it"[2]

is quite unsatisfactory.

The next question is: Why had the disciples got two swords? Whatever our interpretation of the first question, the fact remains that they said, "Here are two swords." It has been said that "the priests, and even the gentle Essenes, often carried weapons when travelling"; but the disciples of Christ surely stood in a different category. The Sermon on the Mount, together with the injunction in St Mark vi, 8—"a staff only"—would make such out of place. The Greek does not really help much, as, although μάχαιρα was used to describe a mere knife for domestic purposes,[3] it was also used to denote a military weapon. But, according to St Luke, the incident took place in the "upper room" immediately after the Passover Feast, where a couple of knives would not unnaturally be on the table. Were these the two swords? St Chrysostom maintains that they were; and in answer to the question why were swords among the followers of Christ, he says:

> "Because of the lamb at the Passover Feast; and the disciples, hearing that certain persons were coming to take Christ, took them (the knives or swords) for defence. Wherefore Peter was rebuked for using it."[4]

There would seem to be strong evidence for this view. There were two men sent to prepare for the feast and two swords are produced; and Peter is one of the two which figure in both

[1] *In Praise of Folly*.
[2] *Harmony of the Gospels*, iv, 299.
[3] *Cf.* Gen. xxii, 6, in the LXX.
[4] Chrysostom, *Homilies*, x, 501.

incidents. These improvised arms, hastily seized through a literal and misunderstood interpretation of Christ's words, seem more in keeping with the situation than a " military equipment." Two small swords among a dozen men would not be very adequate equipment for the coming struggle. We must, therefore, question the meaning of our Lord's reply to the offer of the two swords—viz., " It is enough." That is the third problem.

It will be noted that the statement is not *they* are sufficient; but *it* is enough, or it will suffice. This is important. Was Christ referring to the swords or the conversation? Many ingenius arguments have been put forward to support the " sword " theory. Bede, the historian, says that one sword was to teach the disciples the folly of using material force to defend their Lord and to demonstrate Christ's power to heal; the other, remaining in its sheath, to show that " they were not even permitted to do all they could for His defence." Ambrose sees in them the Old and the New Testaments, " whereby we are armed against the wiles of the devil. Therefore the Lord said: ' It is enough.' "

In the fourteenth century Pope Boniface VIII issued the bull (" Unam Sanctam ") in which he claimed that both the secular and spiritual powers were vested in the Church; and as authority he quoted the words under discussion, urging that " when the Apostles spoke the words, ' Here are two swords,' these swords were in the Church, and that Christ did not say that less than the two would suffice. Therefore we declare, determine and pronounce that " the two swords, both the temporal and the spiritual, are in the power of the Church. So much, then, for the medieval interpretation of " It is enough." There are two other suggestions worth considering. Theophylact in the eleventh century says that

" some say that our Lord said these words *ironically*, as if He said: ' Since there are two swords, they will amply suffice against so large a multitude as is about to attack us.' "[1]

But irony does not seem to be a characteristic of Christ's teaching. If Chrysostom's contention be right that the swords were only the knives used at the feast, then it might well be argued that these words apply to the *size* and not to the quantity of instruments. However, the assumption that the phrase refers to swords or any other weapon at all seems groundless. The more reasonable explanation would seem to be that the disciples quite misunderstood our Lord's meaning about purchasing a sword. Most authorities agree on that, and in the words of Theophylact:

" Our Lord was unwilling to blame them for not understanding Him, but saying, ' It is enough,' He dismissed them; as when we are addressing anyone, and see that he does not understand what is said, we say: ' Well, let us leave him lest we trouble him.' "[2]

[1] *Catena Aurea.* [2] *Ibid.*

A similar phrase occurs in Deut. iii, 26: " Let it suffice thee [literally " enough "]. Speak no more unto me of this matter." The same phrase occurs in the English version of St Mark xiv, 41; although the Greek is different, the meaning would appear to be the same. There is a common idiom in our own language when one would close an unpleasant conversation: we say, " That will do," not thereby signifying agreement, but the end of a disagreement. Modern authorities are agreed that the disciples misunderstood our Lord, and it is very doubtful whether Roman Catholic scholarship to-day would regard this reference in St Luke xxii in the " Unam Sanctam " as anything more than an illustration. We know that the dogma of that document is still held by the Roman Catholic Church; but in two recent commentaries published under the Imprimatur of that body it is said that this passage is " figurative language. We know that Christ forbade the disciples to use the sword in His defence. The Christian's weapons are spiritual. The Apostles had evidently misunderstood our Lord's words, so He dismisses the subject, saying: ' It is enough.' "[1]

When the world's redemption was drawing near, our Lord's disciples misunderstood His meaning and offered Him material swords, and we cannot fathom the depth of His sorrow as He said: " It is enough." It was the shadow of Calvary foretelling the coming storm. Does history repeat itself even after nineteen centuries ? Have we not misunderstood our Lord and the meaning of His message ?

R. F. Wright.

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# CORRESPONDENCE

## CONCERNING ECONOMICS

*To the Editor of* Theology.

Sir,

Mr Preston's contention that a knowledge of economic theory makes *An Introduction to Christian Social Doctrine*, which he reviewed in the February number of Theology, a " horrible mixture of confusions " is quite unfounded. I have a very curious qualification for saying so. In my youth I achieved distinction in the examination of the Institute of Bankers on the subject of economics. I have to inform Mr Preston that as I grew up the contrast between the pronouncements and predictions of the economist and my experience of the frustration of a world governed by economists led me to those very con-

[1] Catholic Scripture Manuals (St Luke: Madame Cecilia), and Westminster Version of the Scriptures (St Luke).

clusions which are now stated to be mixed in such horrid confusion.

But then Mr Preston launches himself from the intolerable standpoint of an atomic view of knowledge. He searches for " a new synthesis of the different specialisms." But the epistemology of that proceeding wants careful watching. Since scientific analysis operates upon selected (specialized) knowledge, the subsequent synthesis unhappily leaves out what has not been selected. A knowledge of *gestalt* psychology would make this clear to Mr Preston.

I invite Mr Preston to tell us whether the specialism of economics is anything more than a technique for arranging certain of our material affairs. Would it be correct to call it a system of manners ? And are those manners nice ?

An opinion which expresses distaste is more easily dealt with if the grounds for that distaste are disclosed. Here Mr Preston is reticent. It is clear that he believes that society can come to salvation by science. This belief experience has contradicted, and will contradict. Beyond this belief we have one quotation. Since if Mr Preston were to read Mr J. M. Keynes' book on " Money " he would find much the same opinion as Father Peck now sets forth, I cannot see that this particular evidence proves very much.

I must apologize for reviewing a review at this length, but after all it *is* important that the way to God should not be confused with the evil conventions of sinful man.

K. E. Barlow.

*March* 19, 1942.

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The Rev. Ronald Preston writes:—

It will perhaps be most convenient if I reply to Dr Barlow's letter by taking each of his first four paragraphs in turn.

1. Dr Barlow regards the whole subject of economics as built on erroneous foundations (though he apparently finds merit in Mr J. M. Keynes), but advances the slenderest reasons for doing so. To say that the world is governed by economists is simply absurd. It would be truer to say that economic policy during the thirties flew in the face of the bulk of expert opinion. Not that it is desirable that the world should be governed by economists; their role is a more modest one, as will appear below. It is also relevant to point out, in view of Dr Barlow's third sentence and of the fact that my quotation from Mr Peck was on a monetary point, that while the theory of Equilibrium has undergone no major modifications since before the last war, having freed itself from the utilitarian philosophical presuppositions amid which it was developed by the classical economists, the theory of Economic Dynamics advanced considerably

between the two wars. This deals, of course, among other things, with cyclical fluctuations and with money. Its progress has been largely due, apart from the stimulus of the great depression, to the general agreement over the logically prior theory of Equilibrium. The upshot is that we are in a far better position to deal with monetary and trade cycle policy than before. While many questions are unsettled, there is overwhelming evidence of the ability of the tools of economic theory to grapple, within the limits of the field it covers, with the complexities of the modern world.

2. Obviously metaphysical presuppositions underlie any approach to knowledge. For the Christian his doctrine of God and man gives him the spectacles through which he looks out on the world. The different scientific specialisms, as Dr Barlow says, are concerned only with what can be dealt with by a process of abstraction and must be comprehended in a more complete world view. But that does not mean that they have not a limited and proper autonomy which must be given its due place in the whole, and to understand which a knowledge of the science in question as well as of theology is necessary. For lack of it the medieval synthesis broke down; without it no new one can be achieved. I can see nothing in *gestalt* psychology to invalidate this conclusion.

3. The most famous current definition of economics is that of Professor Lionel Robbins: " The science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses." It is not entirely satisfactory, but it will serve. Purely economic considerations, which may almost be reduced to the avoidance of waste, can always be overruled to a greater or lesser extent by non-economic ones, but at least the science can tell us the economic implications of what we choose, or to use the words of Professor Löwe, " the secondary consequences of our actions, and help us to avoid choosing contradictory policies." (It can tell us, for example, that under present technological conditions we cannot both have more agriculture and maintain the same standard of living with the same or an increased population.) It is folly to ignore such information.

4. I thought my objection to Mr Peck's chapters in the book under review was plainly, not to say bluntly, stated. It is that if one wishes to disagree with the foundations of a subject, it is necessary to understand what those who are trained in that subject think they are doing. The three chapters in question did not appear to me to show that understanding (nor did a previous book by the same author which I had previously reviewed). Instead economic generalizations and analyses were made, without comment or references, which the unwary may accept as sound but which a student at the end of his first year's study of the subject could demolish. From the second

paragraph above it should be clear that I do *not* believe that society can come to salvation by science, nor can I see anything in my review which suggests such a conclusion. Which book of Mr Keynes does Dr Barlow refer to? There have been at least three well-known ones on money between the wars. If he refers to *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, published in 1936, the conclusion to be drawn from that book is surely that just as the doctrinal heretics performed a useful function in forcing the Church to define more precisely what it meant, so monetary " heretics " have stimulated to some extent the thought on money and the trade cycle which has been so fruitful in the last twenty years. That does not mean, however, that the " heretics " are right.

In conclusion, many Christian thinkers seem to regard economics either as a kind of primitive superstition like astrology, or else as a dangerous intellectual heresy, in much the same way as the medievalists regarded natural science. The results are similar. Just as they were deductively convinced, in spite of the evidence of Galileo, that the earth was the centre of the universe, so on reopening the book in question at page 27 I find Mr Peck deductively asserting that world trade is now " but an attempt on the part of each nation to thrust its goods into the markets of others, and to prevent its rivals thrusting their goods into its own markets," when a study of the facts would show that, to take only one example, Germany has been trying for some years to do the exact opposite. Such intellectual behaviour seems incredibly perverse and stubborn to the economist. A more charitable explanation is, as I have recently argued elsewhere, that it proceeds from a wrong theology. But until that theology is corrected and economics is taken seriously, we shall continue to see good and earnest men hitting their head against the walls of a prison cell of their own making, and what is worse, a good proportion of Christian social thinking being dissipated in futility.

## THE CONTINUITY OF PENTECOST

The fulfilment in Christ of Jewish history and prophecy has been adequately emphasized for nineteen centuries. The stress to-day is—and should be—rather on His fulfilment of non-Jewish beliefs. The conventional insistence that the Jews found strange the idea of a Suffering Messiah has somewhat obscured the fact that to the rest of the ancient world the concept of the slain King-God was natural to the point of obviousness. And it is right that, in the story of the Passion, we should become conscious, as Archbishop Söderblom puts it, " how strangely Christ fulfils even the idolatrous rites of weeping for Tammuz

. . . and how the Roman soldiers had a dim sense of an inner meaning when they arrayed Pilate's prisoner as a king of May revels, with purple robe and crown": and how the remark of the bystander at the Cross, hearing the cry " Eloi, Eloi," was, in all probability (as the Old Latin MS. *k* preserves it): " Behold, He calleth on Helios, the sun-god."

Yet though it is possible for us in this century to follow lines of thought which were closed until eighty years ago, there is one point where a study of the Jewish context is still valuable—the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost.

The overwhelming importance of the first Whitsunday as a Christian festival has tended to obscure the significance of Pentecost as a Jewish feast. But, for a correct understanding of the one, it is surely necessary to be acquainted with the atmosphere and the dominant thought-motifs which the other would have inspired in the company of Jews who had just kept it.

For this Midsummer Festival the Lectionary appointed special lessons and psalms which all had a common theme—" a theophany in thunderstorm." From Exodus xix the congregation would be reminded how on Sinai " it came to pass on the third day, in the morning, that there were thunders and lightnings and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud, so that all the people that was in the camp trembled," and in " The Lord came from Sinai " (Deut. xxxiii, probably used as a canticle) would be called to remember again how the Lord " shined forth from Mount Paran, and he came with ten thousands of saints; from his right hand went a fire of law for them." In " The Chariot " (Ezekiel i) they would hear of the Living Creatures who " went every one straight forward; whither the spirit was to go, they went"; that " their appearance was like burning coals of fire, and like the appearance of lamps: it went up and down among the Living Creatures; and the fire was bright, and out of the fire went forth lightning." And of the Man at the centre of that vision they would see, as the Prophet saw, " from the appearance of his loins even upward and from the appearance of his loins even downward as it were the appearance of fire, and it had brightness round about." In the theophany of Habakkuk (iii) would be proclaimed how when God came from Teman " his brightness was as the light; he had bright beams out of his side: and there was the hiding of his power. Before him went the pestilence, and burning coals went forth at his feet." In Psalm xxix, with its description of a great storm, they would hear that " the voice of the Lord divideth the flames of fire," and at the close of Psalm lxviii would exult " to him that rideth upon the heaven of heavens, which were of old: lo, he doth send out his voice, and that a mighty voice."

Though the study of these passages from the anthropological

point of view is itself of extreme interest—Dr Oesterley has pointed out that the festival was originally held in honour of the Sun God, and that " the main thing to emphasize is that the Feast of Pentecost was a Midsummer Festival adapted from the Canaanites who, in their turn, were indebted to Babylonian influence for this "—the more important thing is the simple historical fact that the company at Jerusalem had, at the time of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, just observed the rites connected with the festival. Dr Swete, indeed, says that " the New Testament does not encourage the belief that the selection of the Pentecost (for the outpouring of the Spirit) was due to " the association with the Midsummer Festival, and sees as a reason for the choice merely the historical accident that, as the next great festival after the Passover, it would ensure " a concourse of worshippers from the Dispersion " in Jerusalem. But surely to every Jew the background of the Lectionary would be as familiar as to the modern reader it is unknown, and he would be able the more fully to appreciate the implications of the story that " when the day of Pentecost was fully come, they were all with one accord in one place. And suddenly there came a sound from heaven, as of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they were sitting. And there appeared unto them cloven tongues, like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them; and they were all filled with the Holy Ghost."

Hugh Ross Williamson.

Cambridge.

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The Mind of St Paul. By T. R. Glover. (Annual Lecture on a Master Mind.) Humphrey Milford. 2s.

A lecture on a master mind is a tall order. It is an attempt to analyse one who, almost by definition, escapes analysis. If one dwells upon his more human characteristics and attempts to depict him as a man, one has to omit just those traits which distinguished him as a master mind. When the man in question is St Paul, the consequences might be serious. Fortunately, the lecture was delivered by Dr Glover, who has been able to write a pleasant and discursive essay without offence and without fatuity.

F. C. S.

# BOOK REVIEWS

THE SCREWTAPE LETTERS. By C. S. Lewis. Geoffrey Bles. 5s.

The little books of religious instruction or edification—so numerous, so well-intentioned, so ill-written, so infinitely dull—will, I suppose, continue to cumber the shelves of our book-shops and our pious homes even in war-time. We must therefore be specially grateful for a little book which may be called admirable without reserve. Mr Lewis has done a very difficult thing superlatively well. He has compressed into no more than 160 pages of large clear print enough good theology, good psychology, good moral and ascetical teaching, good apologetic, and good Christian sense to fit out at least four little books, each one of which would make most of its little rivals superfluous. For apologetic, read his brief, excellent discourses upon " reality " (chaps. i and xxx), divine foreknowledge and human prayer (chap. xxvii), change and permanence (chap. xxv), and his " asides " upon a superstitious materialism or " Puritan " as a term of abuse; above all, enjoy the delicate skill with which on many pages he punctures the pretentiousness of the highbrow in slavery to current *clichés* and intellectual fashions. For psychology, consider his analyses of unselfishness, of hatred, of physical fear; study in particular his diagnosis of domestic frictions and irritabilities (chap. iii) and his thoughts (chap. xviii and xix) upon marriage and " being in love."

It is upon a sound psychology and a knowledge of the ' classics ' of the spiritual life that his own more technically " ascetic " doctrine is based. Instructed and " practising " readers will welcome fresh light upon familiar truths (this is a book to which, for once, the word " brilliant " may be applied, not politely but exactly), for his discussions of false spirituality, for example, or of dryness and distractions in prayer, or of humility, or of the religion of feeling, would serve as serious commentaries upon well-known pages of *The Spiritual Combat* or *The Hidden Life of the Soul*. To the man who has hitherto kept ascetic literature at arm's length they may open a window upon new horizons, for there is happily some chance that he may read them—some chance, that is, that a sufficient number of the ordinary book-buying public will perceive delightedly the quality, if not of the author's thought, at least of his wit and his handling of the English tongue, and make the book a best-seller.

It was Gilbert Chesterton, I think, who taught an earlier generation that Luther's opinion (quoted by our author on his first page) that " the best way to drive out the devil . . . is to jeer and flout him " is gloriously true. For many years that inspired *franc-tireur*, sharp-shooting from behind the hedges of

an invaded Christendom, made laughter the most formidable weapon of all in the defence of its homesteads. Certain "progressive" circles have never quite forgiven him for being far quicker, far cleverer, and far more amusing when preaching Christian orthodoxy than they can ever contrive to be when gibing at it. A formidable weapon, but one which not many writers in any generation are qualified to wield. The primary and essential qualification for its wielder is that he should fully, and even fiercely, *believe* the Gospel—knowing it, loving it, desiring to live by it. Only the man whose loyalty is rooted far below the surface breezes—the passing doubts of mood or vogue—can happily make jokes about his creed; can "jeer and flout" carelessly, genially, at his self-confident ease. And, further, he must have the story-teller's gift and pen to allure even a reluctant reader to go reading on. More than half of Chesterton's persuasive power lay in his skill to make us sure that the story of man's salvation was lit with all the colours of a great romantic drama—a story rapid like a schoolboy's "thriller," full of danger and urgency and critical choices.

Mr Lewis has a very different manner and method from the Chestertonian; his laughter is more subtle and demure, and his ironic tradition is rather that of Swift and Butler—a measure of his excellence being that one can set the three names side by side without absurdity. But we see in him many marks of the Jester-Apologist of true brand. He points epigrams for the pricking of bladders or the uncovering of shams with easy expertness; he knows his theology (it is professed students who will best appreciate his reflections upon natural pleasures, the delusion of human "ownership," the "historical Jesus"), and his whole book is a picture in strong bright colours of the human soul as the centre of a cosmic conflict—terrible, dramatic, eternally significant.

It is impossible not to hope that he will give us other (even "little") books as tonic and enlightening as this one. Meanwhile he has temporarily solved two recurrent problems—what to read to retreatants at meal-times (if reading there must be), and what to give the intelligentsia for Easter or Christmas presents.

Charles Gillett.

Cambridge.

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The Historic Mission of Jesus. A Constructive Re-examination of the Eschatological Teaching in the Synoptic Gospels. By C. J. Cadoux. Lutterworth Press. £1 1s.

Dr Cadoux has the exact and critical scholarship which his present task demands, and this attempt to present in one survey the message and mission of Jesus, besides serving as a useful work of reference for students, will provide the more advanced

reader with much stimulating material for reflection. There is evidence enough of the author's easy familiarity with the best of recent writing here and in Germany, and the footnotes are particularly rich in penetrating criticisms.

It is the more to be regretted, therefore, that Dr Cadoux's conclusions are disappointing and inadequate. Jesus, because of His " unique filial intimacy " with God, knew Himself to be the Messiah and taught that in His work the Kingdom of God was already present, since He was Himself performing the divine will and teaching the same obedience to others. Because He conceived His task to be the gathering together of a community which would submit itself to God's claims, He applied to Himself the title " Son of Man," taken from Daniel, and saw in His work the fulfilment of the ideas associated with the Servant in Deutero-Isaiah. At first He expected the Jews to repent at His summons, to be reconciled to Rome, and to fulfil the universalistic aspirations of the prophets. At this period He spoke of the future manifestation of the Kingdom " with power," as a time when, by Israel's fulfilment of its vocation, God's will would be perfectly obeyed. This was to be a time of blessing for the righteous, in which the dead would share after their resurrection. Later on, when it became evident that the Jews would not listen to His plea, Jesus saw in His death the means whereby they would be brought to a realization of their sin in rejecting Him. The failure to learn to love the Roman enemy meant that Jerusalem must be destroyed; but after ruin and disaster would come the Parousia of the Son of Man. Jesus did not anticipate His Resurrection, the Church's belief in which was due to a misunderstanding of the " objective visions " experienced by the disciples.

This summary is misleading because it has sacrificed for brevity's sake the proportions of Dr Cadoux's treatment. In any attempt to give an inclusive account of the Gospel message it is obvious that right proportion of part to part is as important as proper estimation of the weight of each piece of evidence. Here as much space is given to the political significance of the Kingdom as to the meaning of the Cross. The result is a confusion of primary and secondary issues, leaving an impression very different from that of the gospels themselves.

Again, Dr Cadoux's conclusions about such vitally important questions as the nature of the Kingdom of God and the meaning of the Passion fail to do justice to the gospels. It is surely a mistake to equate our Lord's idea of the Kingdom with that of the Rabbis, who spoke of taking upon themselves " the yoke of the Kingdom " in order that by doing God's will, as revealed in the Law, they might make effective His sovereignty over them. The primary meaning of the Kingdom in the gospels is not obedience to the King's will, but the manifestation of His power. Dr Cadoux protests against a theology which would detract

from the importance of man's dedication of his energies to God; but the true doctrine of the Kingdom safeguards both God's sovereignty and man's responsibility. The Kingdom " exercises violence "; it is present in the work of Jesus expelling demons, forgiving sin, and declaring God's will, but it is only " men of violence ", prepared to sacrifice all else, who can enter into its sphere. Dr Cadoux's view of the future Kingdom is that its coming depends upon man's increasing submission to the will of God; but the Gospel view regards it as the full manifestation of God's power, affording final salvation to men. Such correspondence between the teaching of St Paul and our interpretation of the Kingdom is too complete to be the result of the reading into the one of the ideas of the other. St Paul's doctrine of Grace is already present in the Lord's Prayer, " Thy Kingdom come. Thy will be done." The order of the clauses is fixed and must not be reversed by criticism.

Equally unsatisfactory is Dr Cadoux's account of the meaning of the Cross. He agrees that Jesus applied to Himself the idea of the Servant of God, but sees the effect of the suffering both of the Servant and of Jesus in making men " penitently conscious of their own sins." This interpretation, he claims, is confirmed by evangelical experience and is to be preferred to any theory which explains the Cross in the light of " primitive, enigmatic, and semi-magical (or at least unethical) ideas of atonement by blood." Dr Cadoux's explanation misses the deepest meaning of the Servant songs: as applied to the Passion it is utterly inadequate. That there is nothing unethical about the idea of Christ's death as a sacrifice, and that no other interpretation will fit the facts, has been sufficiently demonstrated by Dr Vincent Taylor.

A further criticism may be levelled against Dr Cadoux's account of the political factors in our Lord's teaching. It is questionable whether in His lifetime hatred of the Roman rule was " a terrible obsession with which the mind of practically the whole nation was seething." After the fall of Jerusalem there was a very natural increase in resentment and bitterness; but the action of Akiba in anointing the rebel Bar Kochka as Messiah would have been unthinkable a generation earlier. It is unlikely, therefore, that Jesus was as vitally concerned with the political rôle of the Messiah as Dr Cadoux claims. The evidence adduced from the gospels is meagre and inconclusive.

This work is to be welcomed as an attempt to see as a whole the results of Gospel study in the various fields. If it fails it is because it does not satisfy the demands of the Gospel materials themselves.

G. O. Williams.

Lampeter.

THE VOCATION OF ENGLAND. By Maurice B. Reckitt and J. V. Langmead Casserley. Longmans. 5s.

This book has been roughly handled by Mr Sidney Dark in the *New Statesman*, and it is indeed of a kind to offend those who believe that nothing happened at the Malvern Conference but a demonstration in favour of Sir Richard Acland's brand of moralistic state socialism. No doubt the economics will be dealt with by the Rev. Ronald Preston in some other place, since he always charges in whenever economic heresies are mentioned. In this matter it is hardly likely that a fairly regular contributor even to the literary side of the *New English Weekly* can be accepted as an impartial witness, but I must say that I cannot see what all the fuss and bother is about. I have not made a special study of anyone's economics, but I know that the economists have often been wrong, and that the loose generalizations of their critics have sometimes gone very near to the heart of the matter. Should Carlyle and Ruskin have been forbidden to speak on political economy without a certificate of competence from Mr John Stuart Mill? Doubtless they dealt rashly with a complex specialized subject. But we should be worse off if they had held their tongues, and the Church of England would be worse off without the conversation of Mr Maurice Reckitt.

That may seem off the point, but it is not. Most of this book seems to me to spring from Mr Reckitt's conversation round the summer of 1940. Mr Casserley gets in some paragraphs that are all his own on the history of the English political parties, where I find his dialectical abstractions very hard to follow. And I am sure that he has often played an important part as a critic, restraining Mr Reckitt from breaking out into a long tirade against the banking system. But the flavour of the book is that of *Christendom* editorials (some passages, if I mistake not, are reproduced), and some notes of the week in the *New English Weekly*. To my mind it is all a great deal nearer practical politics than the more popular and more sanguine *Unser Kampf*. It has got some relation to what actually may happen.

First of all the authors realized that a revival of agriculture is urgently necessary, and that the method by which it is to be accomplished is a matter of serious and urgent controversy. On economics they may be amateurs. On soil fertility and nutrition they have most of the experts with them, and those may turn out to be more fundamental subjects than the science of distribution. Secondly, they are not romantic about the country. They know it is a hard, lonely place, and that the rural outlook, so often praised, has in it a large element of unassimilated paganism, not joyous paganism, but grim fear of Nature. And they know that any reconstruction of the country involves a parallel reconstruction of town life. Some steps have been taken in this direction through the dispersal

of industry to avoid air-raids. The future of the medium-sized town, in social life and local government, is a fascinating practical subject, and there is at least something about it here. Thirdly, they believe that the present policy of state control over industries organized as corporate bodies, under representatives of the owners, the workers, and the management, is not just a transition to socialism, but a way on to a modern version of the old guild system. They would tighten state control by extending it to credit as well as to prices. They have no dogmatic objection to land nationalization. But they do not idealize state-run factories or state-run farms. Nor does anyone out of the Left. Here again they seem much nearer to what might be expected of a post-war national Government under such a non-party figure as Sir Stafford Cripps is becoming.

They are against federation with the Empire, with America, or with the world. They have the temerity to believe that the small nations want to go on being independent, and that we can do most for them, and for the overseas countries, if we dare to retain our independence of action. In a useful chapter on religion in England they are, as might be expected, firm for orthodoxy, but also sensible in their objections to an attitude which would flee to the hills and content itself with no more than minority action for ever and ever. Like Mr T. S. Eliot, whom they quote liberally, they take our diffused Christianity seriously. But they have no immediate expectations of a spiritual revival. They are no utopians.

Some criticisms may be made. The book was written in difficult circumstances, and I feel that Mr Reckitt and Mr Casserley have been unwilling to press implied criticisms of Dominion and American culture. They allow themselves to appear over-optimistic about the Englishness of New England and the English-speaking Dominions, though in another place they point out the diverse composition of the American people. They also seem to me reluctant to face the inevitable limitations of England's power to decide her own destiny. Given victory, there are still Russia, China, and South America, as well as the United States. All will have their say not only about Europe's frontiers, but about our markets and sources of supply. Another difficulty, perhaps inherent in the partnership, is that they have only hinted at the means they would employ to distribute property to as many people as possible in an industrial society. The social dividend is associated in many minds with the myth of an age of plenty, and ninepence for fourpence. If Mr Reckitt really thought it could do all that used to be said for it, he would certainly have written another book than this, and all about it. But he ought not to bring it in without explaining, however briefly, what it is and what he now thinks it could do.

Kelham. George Every, S.S.M.

WHAT IS CHRISTIAN EDUCATION? By Marjorie Reeves and John Drewett. Sheldon Press. 1s. 6d.

The publishing of this record of group thinking is both opportune and provocative. With a stimulating foreword by Miss Dorothy Sayers, it attempts to cover the whole school life of the child from the nursery school to the post-primary stage. It is brief, but intense; indeed, so crowded with suggestive points as to demand close attention to each paragraph. Up and down the country, in response to the Church leaders' appeal, groups of people have been and are studying religious education. This is just the book to help them to clarify their minds and promote discussion.

The matter of the book is revolutionary in that it cuts right across educational policy of recent years. Its plea for the comparatively small school, closer co-operation with parents, the family as the central unit, local community interest, the Christian sense of vocation as opposed to careerism, leadership problems, elasticity in system and curriculum, condemn the present direction of education, the rigidity of the Hadow scheme with its corollary of scholarships to higher education. But in its emphasis upon the right "values" in education lies the great importance of the book. Opposing the prevailing policy of the school as a factory for producing a clever child it sees the child as belonging to God, and the aim of education to develop wholly its personality in accord with the divine purpose. This view, well worked out, gives a direction and basis utterly at variance with all totalitarian ideas or theories of the modern state, and holds in effect that the child is of God, to whom teachers and authorities are responsible for its care, and that loyalty to God must come first.

The aim of Christian education should be to develop at every stage of its growth the child's personality and creative feeling. I well remember taking the late Eric Gill into a primary classroom where the chalk drawings of the children were displayed. After examining them he threw his arms into the air and said despairingly: "God, how do they kill this?"

This all-embracing aim in education of the "good" child demands, as the book insists, the "good" teacher. It will not concede that religious teaching is alone the function of parents and clergy. Education is inevitably a relationship between persons, and in stressing "that a teacher cannot teach what he does not believe, or believe what he does not teach, and retain his personal integrity," the authors are at one with the Archbishops' pronouncement. Although it focuses attention markedly on the importance of the teacher's part in Christian education, the book fails to show how the "good" teacher is to be produced. The Principal of a training college remarked to me not long ago: "If the Board of Education had devoted a tenth of the time and money spent on buildings to training

the personality of the future teachers, how different would be the atmosphere in our schools to-day !"

The weakness of the book lies in its evasive language as to the part of the Church in Christian education. It writes of " Christian co-operation " and the Christian community as if it were some ethereal essence floating round the streets, especially in the chapters on the post-primary stage.

The root problem envisaged by the authors is not only to bridge the gulf between school and work, but more so to bridge the gulf between school and Church. The child is recognized as a child of God and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven, but not as a " member of Christ " and a child of grace. Unless Christian education is closely related to the setting of some particular denomination, unless it is practised as a living faith expressed in a visible fellowship, it fails in its purpose. To write " in present circumstances the leadership and initiative for bringing into being such conditions as we have outlined seem unlikely to come primarily from the Church" is a counsel of despair. Whence else is it to come ? God must be shown and worshipped on earth, not by redeemed individuals or groups, but by a redeemed society. It is this redeemed fellowship the world needs to-day, and in its restoration to renewed vigour and leadership Christian education must be the greatest driving force.

The wider outlook called for in the book should be a challenge and stimulus to Christian ministers, school managers and lay folk alike. There is still a third of the school children in our land attending denominational schools, where full Christian teaching is unfettered. The aim of the authors and their committee should be to win the immediate co-operation of those responsible for these schools in carrying out their ideas and aims.

W. S. Evans.

South Croydon.

## SHORTER NOTICES

*Living under Tension*, by Harry Emerson Fosdick (S.C.M., 7s. 6d.), consists of twenty-five sermons on Christianity to-day. It takes its title from the first of the series, which is, indeed, the pearl among many rubies. Whether we recognize it or not, we are doomed to the tension of living in two worlds. " This present world, war-torn and terrible, denies everything that Christ taught and stood for . . . and in this world, part and parcel of its grim necessities, we must live. Yet we are Christians too " (p. 2). How are we to live as Christians in a world at war ? Dr Fosdick asserts throughout these trenchant sermons his conviction that " these mad days " constitute a challenge to our faith in the higher world of invisible power which should

issue in penitence, action and hope. There is a wealth of thought and anecdote included under the following suggestive titles, to name but a few: "Winning the War of Nerves," "The Modern World's Rediscovery of Sin," "The God who made us and the Gods we Make," "God talks to a Dictator," and "A Great Year for Easter." Here is prophetic religion in a modern dress, searching, candid, damning, yet full of faith in the living God, and written by the pen of a great preacher.

Four discussions broadcast by the B.B.C. on February 26 to March 1, together with two addresses given on Sunday, March 2, and the addresses in the "Lift up your Hearts" series, February 24 to March 1, 1941, have recently been issued by Canon F. A. Cockin under the original broadcast title *Three Men and a Parson* (Longmans, 1s.). The talks aroused widespread interest at the time and were welcomed as a sincere attempt to answer the question, What has the Christian faith to say to the life of this country at this moment at which the values of the democratic and of the Christian way of living, as we have understood them, are being challenged and tested as never before?

Two pamphlets by Fr Barker which we have received differ remarkably in quality. *Intercommunion*, by Joseph Barker, C.R. (Pax House, 4d.), is a well-meant caveat directed against those who feel the weakness of organized Christianity in face of the tremendous forces of evil at work in the world, and who urge that Christian unity can best be promoted by the immediate practice of intercommunion. A lot of people are going about saying, "Let us sink our differences at least for the duration of the war." Fr Barker replies in effect, "Not so, Lord; for I have never eaten anything unclean!" On the other hand, *Sacrificial Priesthood*, by the same author (Dacre Press, 1s. 6d.), is a careful and scholarly discussion of the Godward and sacrificial function of the priesthood. Fr Barker begins by pointing out the frequent overshadowing in recent years of "priestly religion" by "prophetic religion" because the latter "stands for a high standard of spirituality, often combined with a definite demand for social justice, presented in a forcible and attractive way" (p. 8). His appeal to the Eucharistic practice of the early Church has more than academic value. But it suffers somewhat from compression. It is very doubtful if Tertullian's remarks in *De Orat.* vi (cited on p. 25) refer to the Eucharist as daily bread. More cogent evidence for Fr Barker's purpose is provided by Cyprian *Epp.* liv 3 and lvi 1 than by *Ep.* xii 2. But Tertullian's reference to the custom of reserving the consecrated bread on station days and carrying it home to partake of it before ordinary food (*De Orat.* xix; *cf.* Cyprian, *De Lapsis* xxv) seems to militate against the theory of a daily Eucharist in that region at that date. The frequency of celebrating the Eucharist to-day in communities of priests or in colleges where many priests are living together, with a limited number of altars, is

a practical problem for them. It is equally a problem for the solitary priest in a country district where no congregation is possible for a daily celebration of the Mysteries.

Speaking of colleges reminds us that those who are giving attention to the future of our theological colleges would do well to read *The Study of Divinity in Trinity College, Dublin, since the Foundation*, by J. E. L. Oulton, reprinted from *Hermathena* (November, 1941) and published at Dublin (Hodges, Figgis and Co., 6d.). The closing paragraph should be noted.

Returning once more to the needs and the difficulties of the parish priest, whether town or country, we would draw attention to two excellent devotional manuals. *Prayers in Time of Strife*, by Michael Bruce (S.P.C.K., 1s.), is admirably comprehensive. Composed in language sufficiently modern to be understood by all, yet phrased with sufficient care not to grate on ears attuned to the stately language of the Prayer Book, these prayers range from petitions for humility, the spirit of sonship, and a right sense of values, to a thanksgiving for the beauty of buildings which have been destroyed. Prayers for the Services, those engaged in the war effort, and those who suffer because of the war are also included. We hope they will be widely used. *Common Prayers in Time of War* (Church Literature Association, 1s.) provides a short service with special intention for each day of the week. Many of the prayers should prove most helpful. There are also special psalms and two lessons for each day.

C. W. Dugmore.

Tixall.

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Christian instruction of a popular kind and at moderate prices is greatly needed in these days, and this bunch of half a dozen books witnesses to the efforts being made in one form or another to supply it. But two preliminary questions surely require to be asked, and it is not always clear that the authors have clearly posed them. *For whom is this book intended?* Believer, half-believer or unbeliever; the well-educated, the average churchgoer (if there is one), the man in the street? On the answer depends the second question, *Is the language calculated to reach that audience?* The reviewer has to confess that several of these books seem to fail by its being too difficult, technical or beyond common range. Now this matter of vocabulary is of pressing importance. A scholar thinks in scholar's terms; but a teacher of the public has to translate it into his public's terms. Otherwise the best efforts will be fruitless.

Fr Branscombe[1] on the whole does not fall into either error. He sets out to provide a *Child's Book of the Catholic Religion*, and

[1] *Heavenward Bound.* By E. T. W. Branscombe. Pax House. 7s. 6d.

it is attractively written and charmingly illustrated. But its usefulness will be limited by the extreme definiteness of the narrowly "Anglo-Catholic" faith which it presents. Is it necessary, *e.g.*, that the child of twelve or less shall be taught without qualification that "only Jesus and Mary were without [the stain of original sin]"?

Fr Holmes, the veteran missionary of the Oxford Mission to Calcutta, explains his booklet[1] as arising out of a request that he should write a series of instructions on the Holy Eucharist. His Indian experience has confirmed him in the belief that "the characteristic mark of the Christian religion" is that "its life and worship are fused into one." He has therefore written a brief outline of what it means to be a Christian, and placed the Eucharist in its setting of the *Newness of Life* which is Christianity. His exposition is typically Scriptural and devotional, full of meat for the devout, but too difficult for the beginner. For whom is it meant?

The Bishop of London's Lent book has this year been written by Dr Raven.[2] It is not an easy book to review. It attracts by its passionate belief in a personal religion centred in Christ, and we rejoice in such testimony from the Regius Professor. It repels occasionally by its unhappily characteristic outbursts. It puzzles, at moments, by the flamboyance of its rhetoric. Indeed, its language and allusiveness are often far above the heads of the common folk to whom the book could bring revival of hope and vision. Sometimes one wonders what there is beneath the flashing surface. But those who persevere will be rewarded—often by a fresh and suggestive interpretation of some familiar Gospel passage, a penetrating comment which is the fruit not of scholarship and thought only, but of prayerful devotion, and everywhere by the burning conviction that in the Christ who is our contemporary are to be found the springs of life which "the terror and splendour of these apocalyptic days" demand.

We come to two bishops, and it is good to find them among teachers of the Faith. Bishop Barkway of St Andrews writes an attractive little essay, setting out in clear and logical form the arguments for the *Christian belief in Christ*[3] as perfect God and perfect man. It is of especial interest as coming "out of the experience of one who for many years thought the Christian claim incredible, and who knows every possible objection

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[1] *Newness of Life.* Instructions in Christian Life and Worship. By W. H. G. Holmes. Mowbrays. 2s.

[2] *Lessons of the Prince of Peace.* By C. E. Raven. Longmans, Green and Co. 2s. 6d.

[3] *The Christian Belief about Christ.* By Lumsden Barkway, Bishop of St Andrews. Mowbrays. 1s. 6d.

against it." It is well calculated to meet the problems of those for whom it is clearly intended.

The Bishop of Bradford's book on the Prophets[1] is more disappointing. It is far too tightly packed. In 160 pages he traces the succession of prophets from Moses to John the Baptist, but gives us no general discussion on what constitutes a prophet. Too much space is taken up with details of particular passages, and overmuch stress laid on literary difficulties and discrepancies in the history. The result is rather a compendium of information (and in this it is admirable) than a gallery of living persons. Here, too, the language demands a considerable previous acquaintance with technical terms of Old Testament Higher Criticism.

It is perhaps because Mgr Knox's book[2] is a direct transcript of actual addresses given to a specific audience—the Roman Catholic undergraduates at Oxford whose Chaplain he was—that it seems more successful than many of the series. These conferences were designed to convey the answers to those intellectual questions which his hearers, whether as Christians or in the narrower sphere as Catholics of the Roman obedience, were likely to be called on to face. In the space of a few pages profound questions of doctrine are laid bare with shrewdness, wit, and a masterly use of illustration. There are naturally several points where a non-Papal Catholic cannot follow the Monsignor, and others where he feels in a strangely different mental climate. But these addresses deserve to be commended as admirable models of dogmatic and apologetic teaching in an attractive and telling form.

HENRY DE CANDOLE.

HENFIELD.

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CHURCH ORGANS AND ORGAN CASES. By Andrew Freeman. S.P.C.K. 1s.

Hitler's bombs have destroyed many of our churches and so many of our church organs. When peace comes and the damaged churches are restored and new churches built, the question of the purchase of an organ for such churches will be a practical one. The Rev. A. Freeman, who is an expert on the subject, offers in this pamphlet much sane and sensible advice.

He discusses the question of the right position for the organ. In the olden days choirs and organs were generally placed at the west end of the church, very often in a gallery. The present

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[1] *The Goodly Fellowship.* Studies in the Hebrew Prophets. By A. W. F. Blunt, Bishop of Bradford. Mowbrays. 4s. 6d.

[2] *In Soft Garments.* A Collection of Oxford Conferences. By Ronald Knox. Burns Oates. 6s.

custom of placing the organ and choir in the chancel is a recent one. Mr Freeman, however, is no faddist. The position chosen for the organ should be the one that is most suitable; there must be ample room for the organ and the choir, as the organist must be near the singers. Where there is adequate accommodation, no objection can be taken to chancel choirs and organs.

Another point Mr Freeman deals with is the appearance of the organ. If there is an organ in the church it should be made, as far as is possible, a thing of beauty. Many organs have been built with ugly organ cases. I can think of one cathedral where there are rows of hideous pipes painted brown and looking like massive rolls of linoleum. "It has to be conceded," writes Mr Freeman, "that an organ is not, in the technical sense, one of 'the ornaments of the church,' but that is no reason why it should not be a real ornament to the church in which it stands."

He rightly says that "harmoniums and American organs (so called) are most unsatisfactory instruments for church use." Where there is no organ, a piano is a more satisfactory instrument to accompany the singing. Many seem to imagine that the wheezy monotonous tone of the harmonium is more "devotional," and therefore more suitable for church use. I know cases where, the church having been destroyed, the services have had to be held in the parish hall, and, although a good piano was available, a harmonium was procured to accompany the services. This is definitely a mistake.

There are a number of excellent illustrations of organs and organ cases at the end of the pamphlet.

LIVERPOOL. O. R. CLARKE.

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DIPLOMACY AND GOD. By George Glasgow. (Longmans. 7s. 6d.)

This book, which is a somewhat unsystematic survey of recent international affairs, is marred by the author's inveterate habit of mere moralizing. Again and again, in the midst of a political discussion, he steps aside to indulge in abstract truisms. As, for instance, after a few pages of analysis of Anglo-German relations, he says: "It is often to be observed in human experience that when we cease to be guided by faith in God, our decisions are prompted by fear: and fear leads to disaster" (p. 46). After a time, that kind of thing becomes irritating. The journalist turned preacher cuts a sorrier figure than the preacher turned journalist.

A more serious and substantial criticism of the book, however, is Mr Glasgow's seeming inability to distinguish between the institutional and the personal realms as fields of ethical behaviour.

He seems to assume or imply that diplomacy is as susceptible to *Christian* action as purely personal relations; that in a given political situation there is a Christian way out, in the sense that there is a possibility of action in accord with the Sermon on the Mount. That does credit to the fresh idealism of Mr Glasgow, after his long years of experience of diplomatic duplicities and triplicities. But as Professor Brogan has recently inquired, Is innocence enough? To criticize Balance of Power as lacking faith in God is to be incredibly naive and irrelevant. Of course, it lacks faith in God. But politics, especially international politics, is an attempt to balance conflicting egotisms. That is the nature of the beast. But faith in God is to transcend egotism.

This inability of Mr Glasgow's leads him, to put it mildly, to a most inadequate evaluation of political situations. On pages 10 to 11 he quite seriously compares the anarchy of international relations to a dozen children, sitting at a well-laden table, who gobble up the food within their reach—a perfect gem in the art of simplification. " The facts ", says Mr Glasgow, " really are so crude in their essence " (p. 11). There is no space here to show that the comparison is ludicrously misleading. I must content myself with a flat negation.

It is this same inadequate evaluation that inspires Mr Glasgow with his greatest delusion—namely, that the follies and evils of international relations are due to the failure of men to *learn* from the lessons of the past. This is pure Socratism, innocent of biblical realism. After the last war, the majority of men and of statesmen (who are also men) *knew*, as a mere matter of ratiocinative realization, that another war would be dreadful, stupid and tragic. The very fact that such a knowledge did not, nevertheless, lead to a changed will ought to suggest to Mr Glasgow that human nature lies under some curse of impotence; that the phrase " original sin ", which he uses, is a fact whose depth is only just beginning to be plumbed.

This book is a warning. It illustrates how fatally easy it is for theological liberalism to hide in the ample folds of orthodox terminology. Eternal vigilance is the price of a vital orthodoxy.

D. R. Davies.

Hull.

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The Iron Ration of a Christian. By Heinrich Vogel. (S.C.M. 6s.)

The title of this book has misled the author of the " blurb " on the dust-jacket (" The writer is driven back to what he believes to be the bare necessities, the iron ration for the Christian soldier in an hour of need "). This is not, however, the product of the Quartermaster's department. It is a brilliant and disturbing call to arms. It is a call to place ourselves in that

situation where iron rations are relevant—to man the barricades, in the author's phrase. The author wrote for Germans who had already experienced persecution, who were already opposed to Antichrist, in order that he might sustain them in the struggle. The title, then, is accurate enough. But his book comes to us with a different emphasis; for if it is the iron ration for the soldier, it is the whip of the word of God to the *embusqué*. It convicts *us* of skulking in the rear.

It is a gay book, provided that one is at the barricades; if one is not, it is uncomfortably critical. There can be no pretending that it is addressed to my neighbour rather than to myself. I found that I was reluctant to get on with the reading of it for this review, a reluctance which was born not of natural sloth but of a disinclination to expose myself to so trenchant a revelation of my unwarriorlike flabbiness and indiscipline. At first, the style being lucid and the vocabulary familiar, one reads without disquiet. Soon, however, it becomes apparent that the tone is becoming personal, the challenge almost indecently pointed.

More than one reading is required, for the words, like the words of St Paul, are burdened with a wealth of meaning which a first reading will not perceive. You will find them all in the respectable pages of English theologians; but here they leap and run and stretch themselves. They take one out of the sober, well-modulated, and Pelagian meadows into wind-swept and exultant country where may be seen the intensity, the vigour, the heights and the depths, of Christianity, its uncompromising character and its courage. This book towers over those little pious books which flow from the religious publishers. They are seen to belong to the spiritual luxury trade, the religious equivalent of cups of tea and cigarettes, articles which enable one to forget that there is a war on.

Vivid sentences spring to the eye wherever one opens the book. Space forbids quotation. In any case, quotation could but whisper. It is intensely orthodox, biblical through and through, and yet it will speak the Gospel to many as though they had never heard it before. Do you answer " Yes " to the question, " Are you a Christian soldier ?"? Then you need the iron ration of a Christian. Do you hesitate to answer? Do you answer, " No "? Then you need this call to repentance. You need to learn the difference between the world and Christianity; the reason why you ought to be, and the reason why you are not, manning the barricades. You need *The Iron Ration of a Christian.* Here is a proclamation of the word of God which laity and clergy alike must pause to read.

F. C. Synge.

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